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Law Clerks Gone Wild 
Parker B. Potter, Jr.† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The title of this Article promises too much (but I’ll bet it did catch 
your attention, and it doesn’t even have a colon!).1  As a career law clerk 
for more than ten years in three different courthouses,2 I’ve never seen a 
law-clerk colleague do anything that would come close to raising an eye-
brow at a spring-break fun-in-the-sun spot.3  But I have developed a pret-
                                                 
† The author is an Adjunct Professor at the University of New Hampshire School of Law in Con-
cord, New Hampshire.  By day, he is a law clerk to a United States District Judge. 
 1. See John Charles Kunich, Shock Torts Reloaded, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 25 n.43 (2006) 
(“[T]he textbook approach to writing law review articles demands that there be a colon buried 
somewhere within the title”); Joshua Deahl & Bernard A. Eskandari, Before & After the Colon, 10 
GREEN BAG 2D 7, 7 (2006) (“There are few patterns more noticeable in law review articles than the 
abundant use of colons in titles.”); Justin Hughes, The Line Between Work and Framework, Text and 
Context, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 19 (2001) (“In the few law review articles I have writ-
ten, I have always struggled to avoid titles with colons.”); Peter C. Alexander, Silent Screams from 
Within the Academy: Let My People Grow, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1311, 1317 (1998) (“One unique cha-
racteristic of Professor [Shakila] Matumba’s scholarship is in the way she titles her articles.  She 
calls them ‘bold statements with no subtext.’  Professor Matumba claims that she is one of a number 
of young scholars using ‘in your face’ writing to wake up a sleeping academy.  Consequently, she 
refuses to use sub-titles and colons as she names her pieces.”); Lara A. Ballard, The Recognition and 
Enforcement of International Criminal Court Judgments in U.S. Courts, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 143, 143 n.a1 (1997) (“The author wishes to thank . . . Roger Bearden, J.D. Candidate, Harvard 
Law School, Class of 1998, for suggesting that the title not consist of two parts separated by a co-
lon”); Sidney W. DeLong, : An Appraisal, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 483, 483 (1991) (“Like a staple in the 
belly of a centerfold, the colon is an intrusive and disconcerting element in the title of a law review 
article. .  . .  Like the fang marks of a pit viper in the neck of a still-quivering tapir, the colon evi-
dences a fatal internal conflict in the title of a law review article. . . .  Like an overdrawn, self-
referential metaphor in the first sentence of an article that you already know is going to be a dud, the 
colon in the title of a law review article confirms the author’s insecurity with himself and his sub-
ject.”); Erik M. Jensen, Food for Thought and Thoughts about Food: Can Meals and Lodging Pro-
vided to Domestic Servants be for the Convenience of the Employer?, 65 IND. L.J. 639, 643 n.21 
(1990) (“On the digestion process, see . . . the titles of just about every other law review essay ever 
written (importance of colon).”).  Perhaps I digress.  But can you blame me?  I’m a law clerk, after 
all, and in my line of work, opportunities for frolic and detour are precious and few. 
 2. In addition to my current position in a U.S. District Court, I spent two years clerking in the 
New Hampshire Superior Court and one year clerking in the New Hampshire Supreme Court. 
 3. That, I hasten to add, is much to the credit of the several dozen law clerks with whom I have 
worked, including my long-time (and perhaps long-suffering) co-clerk, Robert J. “Kyle” Finn. 
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ty good understanding of the contours of a work life conducted in judi-
cial chambers, where one of the principal principles is law-clerk ano-
nymity.4  Thus, whenever I see the term “law clerk” appear in a judicial 
opinion, it catches my attention.  And, believe it or not, that term appears 
in more than 10,000 opinions in the Westlaw ALLCASES database.  
Even after subtracting the hits that result from cases involving prison law 
clerks and disputes over the allowable billing rate for private-firm law 
clerks when attorneys’ fees are at issue, there are hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of opinions in which judicial law clerks have been mentioned, ei-
ther by title or by name.  And, as I said, every time I see a law clerk men-
tioned in a judicial opinion, my eyes open up just a wee bit wider. 
Perhaps this is a version of the little thrill I got, years ago, when, as 
a graduate student in archaeology, I saw my first Indiana Jones movie.  
But, of course, Indy is a fictional character and his exploits with a pistol 
and a bullwhip bore little resemblance to what I did, day after day, with a 
trowel and a dustpan.5  The same disjunction between fiction and non-
fiction holds true for law clerks.  We do show up in popular culture, but 
as commentators have noted, quite correctly, the several dozen fictional 
law clerks who have appeared on television, in the movies, or in novels, 
are rather unlike the several thousand real law clerks who quietly work, 
with a minimum of drama, in state and federal courthouses across the 
country.6 
In any case, this Article grows out of my delight in seeing fellow 
law clerks break through the paper curtain and onto the pages of the Fed-
eral Reporter, the Federal Supplement, or some other compendium of 
judicial opinions.  While my fascination with law clerks as the subjects 
rather than the instruments of judicial writing is probably not universal, I 
have selected the opinions I discuss in this Article with an eye toward 
entertaining—and maybe even instructing, if only slightly—the clerki-
                                                 
 4. That anonymity is illustrated by statements such as this: “The Court has set its even-
numbered law clerk to work to take a preliminary look at that question . . . .”  United States v. Mon-
tana, 149 F. Supp. 2d 368, 371 (N.D. Ill. 2001).  Given the norm of anonymity, it always takes me 
aback to see sentences like this in the Federal Supplement: “The Law Clerk assigned to this case is 
MIKE McSHEA.”  Rosser v. Pipefitters Union Local 392, 885 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (S.D. Ohio 
1995). 
 5. And, just for the record, I am not the first law clerk to jump out of a test pit and into a 
judge’s chambers.  In Oregon v. Bureau of Land Management, 676 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Or. 1978), 
Judge Edward Leavy reported the defendant’s suggestion that “[t]he decision of this case on its 
merits will compel the Court to become a judicial archaeologist, unearthing the ‘bones of the past’ to 
reconstruct transactions better left to history,” id. at 1052, and then (foot)noted: “My law clerk, Julia 
Follansbee, holds an M.A. in archaeology from the University of Oregon,” id. at 1052 n.1. 
 6. See, e.g., John B. Owens, The Simple Truth About 9 Scorpions and The Tenth Justice: Su-
preme Court Law Clerks in Legal Suspense Novels, 88 CAL. L. REV. 233 (2000). 
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gentsia7 and the judiciary.8  So, with that audience in mind, I set off in 
search of law clerks who had gone wild enough to be written about, un-
derstanding, of course, that what I was searching for was a special kind 
of wildness—not the kind that sells suspense novels (or videotapes ad-
vertized on late-night television), but nonetheless, a kind of wildness that 
is likely to resonate with anyone who has ever been a law clerk or seen 
one in action. 
Given my interest in law clerks who have strayed—or been di-
rected—off the beaten path, or off the reservation entirely, I mouse-
clicked right past several kinds of law clerk references: (1) instrumental 
references directing law clerks9 or attorneys10 to take some action or 
another; (2) references to run-of-the-mine law-clerk duties such as com-
municating with parties,11 communicating with other courts,12 conducting 
legal research,13 participating with a judge in meetings in chambers,14 
                                                 
 7. The clerkigentsia consists of former law clerks, current law clerks, and those aspiring to be 
law clerks.  To my ear, “clerkigentsia” sounds better than “clerketariat,” “clerkocracy,” or “clerkoi-
sie.”  John Owens favors the term “clerkarazzi.”  See id. at 237. 
 8. My other selection bias was for opinions in federal cases, which reflects my attempt (sin-
cere, if ineffectual) to keep the length of this article in check, as well as my own heightened interest 
in federal courts, which springs, no doubt, from my current position as a federal law clerk.  Call it 
navel gazing by proxy. 
 9. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Buffalo, 867 F. Supp. 1155, 1172 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (“FURTHER, 
that upon delivery to the Pro Se Law Clerk, the Pro Se Law Clerk shall conduct an initial review of 
such submissions to determine if their subject matter is connected with Walter Jones’ prior lawsuits 
discussed in this Decision and Order.  FURTHER, that the Pro Se Law Clerk shall submit to an 
available district court judge, as designated by the Clerk of the Court, a recommendation as to 
whether such submissions should be filed by the Clerk of the Court.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Brooks v. Quinn & Quinn, 257 F.R.D. 415, 418 (D. Del. 2009) (“On or before 
July 2, 2009, counsel for defendants shall contact Nancy Rebeschini, Esq., the court’s pro se law 
clerk, to schedule a date and time for the written deposition.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 11. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 344 (4th Cir. 2009) (“As 
best we can discern from the appellate briefs and the record below, Judge [Richard] Williams 
(through his law clerk) informed the parties that he would not issue a pretrial order . . . until after 
disposition of the motions to dismiss had occurred.”); see also In re Intermagnetics Am., Inc., 101 
B.R. 191, 193 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (“[T]he incidence of telephone calls to chambers, seeking subs-
tantive advice from law clerks, is markedly increasing.  Such calls are in effect ex parte communica-
tions with the judge and suffer the same vice as any ex parte contact.”). 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263, 268 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The call was followed 
up by a letter from one of the federal district court’s law clerks, asking Maryland state Judge Mis-
souri ‘to provide us with an official position from the [Maryland] Circuit Court as to the legal effect 
of the April 21, 1997 order.’”). 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 257 F. App’x 932, 937 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting the 
trial judge’s statement: “Gentlemen, in anticipation of the renewal or the argument on the mo-
tion . . . I asked this afternoon for my law clerks to . . . pull out some cases from the Sixth Circuit.”); 
N.E. Utils. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d 53, 64 n.10 (D. Mass. 1998) (“My law clerk and a 
librarian ventured to the nether regions of the Social Law Library, the most comprehensive in Bos-
ton, and, after plowing through layers of dust and cracking the spines of untouched tomes of Cana-
dian law, found no reliable compendium of the Quebecois Code.”). 
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and working with a judge on jury instructions;15 and (3) references in 
which a judge talks about law clerks hypothetically or rhetorically, to 
make a point about something else altogether.16  I also gave a wide berth 
to opinions in cases in which a party called for the disqualification of a 
judge, based upon a real or perceived conflict of interest created by the 
past or future employment of a law clerk;17 the law on that issue is 
                                                                                                             
 14. See, e.g., de Silva v. Pitts, 481 F.3d 1279, 1287 (10th Cir. 2007) (“the magistrate judge 
interviewed Jonathan in camera with her law clerk and the court reporter present . . . .”). 
 15. See, e.g., United States v. May, 145 F. Supp. 2d 57, 59 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Todd, 584 F.3d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Just as a mother who 
has had one child in school and prepared his lunch knows that she will prepare the school lunch for 
her second child, just as a judge knows that his law clerks will use Westlaw, so Jerome Todd knew 
that he would use coercion to cause his sex workers to make money for him.”); United States v. 
Johnson, 247 F. App’x 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2007) (reporting the trial court’s explanation to the jury: 
“[I]f I take my magic marker and I give it to my law clerk, and now my law clerk has actual posses-
sion.”); In re Brooks, 383 F.3d 1036, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (criticizing actions of special master, 
explaining: “Indeed, if Balaran could properly serve as special master advising the district court 
whether to initiate contempt proceedings, then it would seem equally permissible for a judge presid-
ing over a criminal proceeding to dispatch his law clerk to visit the scene of the crime, take finger-
prints, interview witnesses, and report back to the judge about his findings.”); Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. 
Am. Longevity, No. 99 CIV. 9854(CSH), 2001 WL 897178, at *14 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2001) 
(“These considerations prompted my law clerk and I to discuss whether I should write a letter to the 
Nobel authorities, nominating my clerk for the Nobel Peace Prize, so that his resume, in addition to a 
reference to his judicial clerkship, could also state that he was a Nobel Peace Prize nominee.  We 
have decided not to pursue this course.”). 
 Perhaps the most chilling hypothetical reference to a law clerk is this one, from Judge David 
Warriner: 
 My law clerk, I suppose, has a right to go down to some political rally and make a 
speech for his favorite candidate for office; but I suppose that if he did it, he would be 
fired.  It is clear that the First Amendment entitles one to engage in political debate but he 
would be fired just the same.  He would be fired because his speechmaking would be de-
trimental to my decisionmaking. 
Funn v. Winston, 484 F. Supp. 923, 924 (E.D. Va. 1980).  While I blanche at the thought of a law 
clerk being fired, for obvious reasons, it is equally obvious that the hypothetical law clerk in Funn 
would have had nothing to complain about, given the code of conduct under which law clerks oper-
ate.  Even more political, but rather less hypothetical, is this: 
 I and every other judge employ law clerks based upon a subjective judgment as to 
whether I think they will or they will not do a good job.  A part of the judgment here is 
based upon statements made by the plaintiff as to her desire to participate in the packing 
phase of the assembly line work. . . . 
 The plaintiff here said she wasn’t very interested in doing the work of packing, that 
she would rather do something else and she wouldn’t work at that very long.  This af-
fected the supervisor’s judgment in much the same way my judgment was affected when 
I had a law clerk tell me he didn’t believe in the Vietnam war and he wouldn’t work on 
any draft cases.  I didn’t hire the law clerk. 
Salton v. W. Elec. Co., No. C-3738, 1972 WL 293, at *4 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 1972). 
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Ruff, 472 F.3d 1044, 1045 (8th Cir. 2007) (criminal defendant 
unsuccessfully sought recusal of trial judge, based on judge’s hiring of law clerk who had previously 
handled his prosecution while working as Special Assistant United States Attorney). 
 Ruff is a relatively ordinary opinion of this genre, but there are some humdingers.  One opinion 
that really hums is Judge Robert McNichols’s opinion in Bishop v. Albertson’s, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 
897 (E.D. Wash. 1992), in which the defendant argued that the judge’s order on a summary judg-
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straightforward, well settled, and amply discussed in the secondary lite-
rature.18  There are plenty of references that fall into the foregoing cate-
gories, but they don’t involve the level of wildness necessary to gain ad-
mission into the main portion of this Article. 
Hitting a bit closer to the mark, but still outside the bull’s-eye, are 
opinions describing unusual things that have happened to law clerks, 
such as being investigated by the United States Attorney on suspicion of 
having leaked the outcome of a patent-infringement case,19 finding mys-
terious powder in the morning mail,20 receiving threatening telephone 
                                                                                                             
ment motion had been tainted as a result of his law clerk’s representation of the plaintiff in a griev-
ance proceeding brought on her behalf by the union to which she belonged and for which the law 
clerk had once worked, but not as a lawyer, id. at 899.  Before reporting that he had reassigned the 
case to another law clerk, Judge McNichols described the institution of the law clerk in considerable 
detail, introducing his discussion this way: “[B]ecause Mr. Allen [the law clerk] takes offense at the 
suggestion that his integrity is anything less than what both he and the Court know it to be, a few 
words about law clerks.”  Id.  Judge McNichols continued: 
 Having laid the groundwork, this memorandum will come to the point.  Mr. Allen is 
troubled by the slur on his integrity.  The Court is troubled by the implicit slur on its 
judgment.  The Court is further troubled by the inference that the motion was not decided 
by an Article III judge.  It was. 
Id. at 902.  After describing the workings of his own chambers, Judge McNicols concluded: 
 The case has been reassigned to another law clerk.  This is not being done because 
of any improper conduct on the part of Mr. Allen, but because now that his former rela-
tionship with plaintiff has surfaced, he would be the first to agree that his continued in-
volvement would be inappropriate. 
Id. at 903. 
 18. See, e.g., 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 70 (2007); Wesley Kobylak, Annotation, Con-
duct or Bias of Law Clerk or Other Judicial Support Personnel as Warranting Recusal of Federal 
Judge or Magistrate, 65 A.L.R. FED. 775 (1983). 
 19.  See Aguirre v. SEC, 551 F. Supp. 2d 33, 40 (D.D.C. 2008).  Happily for the law clerk, “the 
SEC declined to investigate the situation.”  Id. 
 20. See United States v. Adamson, 237 F. App’x 492, 493 (11th Cir. 2007) (“On or about De-
cember 12, 2005, [the defendant] sent a greeting card from prison to a federal district judge that 
contained a white powder.  Not surprisingly, the law clerk who opened the envelope became con-
cerned about the nature of the powder and called a HAZMAT team, but the powder tested negative 
for biological agents, apparently because it was foot powder.”). 
 The litigant mailings at issue in United States v. Blohm, 579 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), 
were even more disturbing, and included the following: 
1. A letter to the judge’s law clerk stating that “This court’s penchant for secretiveness is 
very disturbing.  If it would respond to my efforts to influence it I should not try to inti-
midate it.” 
2. A “complaint” charging Judge Stewart with conspiring to suppress evidence sought by 
Blohm in the litigation before Judge Stewart; the “complaint” stated that the Judge Ste-
wart, Richard Nixon and Arnold Palmer were all in the conspiracy, because “they all play 
golf.” 
 . . . . 
5. A letter to Judge Stewart stating “THE DIFFICULTY I FIND MYSELF IN AT THE 
PRESENT TIME IS NOTHING COMPARED TO THE DIFFICULTY YOU WILL 
FIND YOURSELF IN WHEN THIS THREAT MATTER IS ADJUDICATED IN 
COURT.  YOUR DAYS AS A FEDERAL JUDGE, AND THOSE OF YOUR 
COLLEAGUES ON THE 2ND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, ARE NUMBERED.  
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calls from litigants,21 being badgered by a plaintiff in a civil action,22 be-
ing forced to watch a litigant disrobe in chambers,23 receiving “a com-
munication by telephone from the plaintiff . . . reporting that he [the 
plaintiff, not the law clerk] had developed two lumps in his groin area,”24 
being harassed by a judge,25 being handed a poem written by a juror,26 
                                                                                                             
I SEEK NOTHING MORE THAN YOUR REMOVAL FROM THE BENCH, THE 
‘TRUE’ THREAT IN THIS MATTER, AND YOU KNOW IT.  IF YOU EVER HAD 
THE FEAR OF GOD, YOU’D BETTER HAVE IT NOW.  AT THE VERY LEAST, 
YOU’LL BE INDICTED IN THE PRESS.” 
 This stream of letters culminated in the actions that were the basis for Blohm’s 
criminal indictment.  He mailed a letter addressed to Judge Stewart, care of his law clerk, 
stating “IF I DON’T GET THE RELIEF I SEEK FROM THE U.S. COURT OF 
APPEALS, I’LL BRING A SAWED OFF SHOTGUN TO THE U.S. COURTHOUSE 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSASINATING. . .”.  He also mailed an envelope addressed 
to Judge Stewart and his law clerk containing a shotgun shell box and a holder for fire-
arms ear plugs. 
Id. at 497.  Yikes. 
 21. See Negron v. Horizon Ins. Co., No. 84 Civ. 4563 (MJL), 1986 WL 13448 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
18, 1986).  In that case: 
[O]n November 10, 1986, Negron called this Court and stated that “Judge Lowe is run-
ning a risk” and that “one day he would come here boiling mad and blow someone’s 
fucking head off.”  Several minutes later, a law clerk for Judge Cannella called and in-
formed this Court that Negron had just telephoned them and made threats against both 
Judge Cannella and this Court. 
Id. at *3 n.6. 
 22. See Klimek v. Hunter, 624 F. Supp. 886, 890 n.1 (E.D. Va. May 26, 1985).  After characte-
rizing Adam Klimek as a “continual badgerer” and a “pest,” but noting that “he [had] never been 
obstreperous,” Judge Warriner wrote: 
 Whether Adam Klimek is simply a nut, I don’t know.  But I do know that he is be-
having like one before this Court and I don’t intend to deal with him as a serious person.  
I intend to take appropriate action to end this abuse of the judicial process. 
Id. at 890–91.  That action consisted of dismissing six pending actions filed by Klimek and placing 
restrictions on future filings.  Id. at 891.  Those filings restrictions were vacated on appeal, subject to 
the trial court conducting a hearing.  See Klimek v. Hunter, 819 F.2d 1138 (unpublished table deci-
sion), 1987 WL 35977, at *4 (4th Cir. May 26, 1987). 
 23. See Raz v. Mueller, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (W.D. Ark. 2005).  The incident in Raz was 
described as follows: 
 On October 20, 1998, after being released from LSUMC, Raz went to the Shreve-
port chambers of Judge Henry A. Politz, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit.  He wanted to show Judge Politz the injuries he had sustained 
in the incident of October 13, 1998.  Raz was still suffering the physical and mental ef-
fects of that incident, and its aftermath when he was medicated at LSUMC.  He testified 
that he looked “horrible” and that his speech was slurred and difficult to understand. 
 The visit to Judge Politz’s chambers went predictably awry when Raz began remov-
ing his clothing in the presence of the law clerks in order to reveal his injuries.  Court se-
curity officers were called, and Raz was taken to the United States Marshal’s Office to be 
questioned. 
Id. at 1067. 
 24. Basis v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., CIV. A. No.88-2908 (RCL), 1989 WL 13367, at *1 (D.D.C. 
Feb. 10, 1989). 
 25. See Matter of Seaman, 627 A.2d 106 (N.J. 1993) (suspending superior court judge for sixty 
days, without pay, for sexual harassment of law clerk). 
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being handed a note from counsel during trial,27 being driven from the 
courtroom by an onrushing criminal defendant,28 being verbally threat-
ened in the courtroom by a criminal defendant,29 being involved in the 
resuscitation of a criminal defendant who had attempted to hang himself 
in a holding cell,30 being eyeballed by a witness during trial,31 being in-
                                                                                                             
 26. See Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline of Am., 661 F. Supp. 1448, 1480 (D. 
Wyo. 1987).  Sadly, the opinion in Colorado Interstate Gas does not include the juror’s poem, but 
does include the following judicial commentary on the meaning of the poem: 
NGPL exaggerates the significance of the poem.  Interpreting the poem as a criticism of 
NGPL’s witnesses is pure speculation.  The poem reflects fatigue caused by a lengthy tri-
al requiring the jurors’ intense concentration.  It does not suggest that the jury was biased 
or improperly formed an opinion.  Indeed, the poem is not cognizable evidence of juror 
misconduct. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 27. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 476 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Pa. 1979).  The note was not even accu-
rate: 
 One final example of Mr. Cherry’s discourteous and undignified conduct occurred 
during opening arguments.  I had asked counsel how much time they would need for 
opening speeches and then had imposed time limits accordingly.  Mr. Krimsky was allot-
ted thirty minutes.  After Mr. Krimsky had been speaking for precisely eighteen minutes, 
Mr. Cherry, in full view of the jury, approached the Bench and passed a note to my law 
clerk which stated “Thirty minutes have expired.”  Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cherry inter-
rupted Mr. Krimsky’s opening remarks to state that he had exceeded his time limit.  Be-
cause I had been keeping careful record of the time expired, I knew that this was not the 
case.  These actions on the part of Mr. Cherry were, at the least, rude and impertinent.  At 
most, they were a deliberate attempt to harass and distract Mr. Krimsky and prejudice the 
jury. 
Id. at 97.  For the indiscretion described above, along with “other occurrences . . . too numerous to 
recount,” id. at 97–98, Judge Daniel Huyett revoked Attorney Cherry’s permission to appear pro hac 
vice, id. at 98.  The court of appeals vacated Judge Huyett’s order, holding that Attorney Cherry was 
entitled to “some type of notice and an opportunity to respond.”  Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 
302, 303 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 28. See United States v. Blount, 364 F.3d 173, 176 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 990 
(2005) (“Blount broke free from the security officers and rushed toward the front of the cour-
troom. . . .  Judge Friedman pressed the panic button at the bench and hastened from the courtroom 
with his law clerk.”). 
 29. See Coe v. Bell, 89 F. Supp. 2d 922, 951 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (“Petitioner’s screaming [in 
court] consisted of obscenities and threats directed at the Court, the court clerk, the capital case law 
clerk . . . .”). 
 30. See United States v. Chandler, No. 98 C 2599, 1999 WL 47020, at *1 & n.2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
25, 1999) (“While in the courtroom holding cell awaiting a pretrial proceeding in the underlying 
criminal case, Chandler attempted suicide by hanging.  As a result of the quick response on the part 
of a law clerk and a court reporter sitting in the courtroom before a hearing, Chandler was saved.”). 
 31. See United States v. Armijo, 781 F. Supp. 1551, 1554–55 (D.N.M. 1991) (“Indeed, when 
asked to identify the Defendant in the courtroom, the informant, appearing puzzled, briefly studied 
the Hispanic defense lawyer, the Defendant and, after turning completely around in the witness chair 
and intently concentrating on the Court’s law clerk, also obviously Hispanic, embarrassedly stated 
he was unable to determine which Hispanic was the Defendant.”). 
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volved in an automobile accident while traveling with a judge,32 and sur-
viving an airplane crash.33 
Also close, but not quite worthy of the proverbial cigar, are opi-
nions that simply describe but do not comment on the propriety of law-
clerk duties that are somewhat out of the ordinary,34 such as holding a 
stopwatch on attorneys during trial,35 watching an attorney during trial 
and asking him to sit up when he lounged back in his chair and closed his 
eyes,36 being sworn in as a bailiff,37 being deputized as a county clerk,38 
overseeing a country law library,39 contacting the editorial department at 
West Publishing to ascertain its policies and procedures regarding the 
removal of statutory language from the United States Code Annotated,40 
monitoring the behavior of a juror during trial,41 taking a juror to the 
hospital,42 reconstructing a note sent by a judge in response to a jury 
question,43 questioning a member of a sequestered jury to determine 
                                                 
 32. See LePatourel v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 264, 267 (D. Neb. 1978) (“At the time of the 
accident Judge Denney was operating his vehicle between court points in Nebraska while on official 
business. . . .  The readily discoverable fact that Judge Denney’s law clerk and secretary were with 
him when the accident occurred would have indicated that Judge Denney was then on official busi-
ness.”). 
 33. See Abdulghani v. V.I. Seaplane Shuttle, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 583, 588 (D.V.I. 1990) (“The 
next thing that Abdulghani remembered was that he was floating in the water.  He sank below the 
surface three times, and then a law clerk who had been a passenger on the same plane pulled him to 
a broken part of the plane’s wing.”).  It remains unclear to me why the judge in Abdulghani saw fit 
to mention that the plaintiff’s rescuer was a law clerk. 
 34. My perspective on “out-of-the-ordinary” law-clerk duties is, of course, framed by my own 
experience; the duties I find the most unusual are those that are the most unlike anything I have ever 
been asked to do. 
 35. See Caitpovic v. Peoples Cmty. Health Clinic, Inc., 401 F.3d 952, 958 (8th Cir. 2005) (“By 
pretrial order, the district court limited the trial time to thirty hours, dividing the time equally be-
tween plaintiff and defendant. . . .  The court told counsel, ‘[W]hen you’re on your feet, the clock is 
running.’  The stop-watch was kept by the judge’s law clerk.”). 
 36. See United States v. Nuculovic, No. S3 04 Cr. 1110(DLC), 2006 WL 3591930, at *10 & 
n.15 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2006). 
 37. See United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244, 1251 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Reazin v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1438 (D. Kan. 1987) (“[M]y law clerk, acting 
as bailiff, informed the jury they could take a break from deliberating . . . .”). 
 38. See Koby v. United States, 208 F.2d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 1954). 
 39. See Turiano v. Schnarrs, 904 F. Supp. 400, 406 (M.D. Pa. 1995). 
 40. See Espino v. Shalala, Nos. EP-92-CA-312H, 93-004R-01, 1993 WL 773860, at *12 n.14 
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 1993). 
 41. See Johnson v. Nicholson, 349 F. App’x 604, 605 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 42. See United States v. Wecht, Crim. No. 06-0026, 2008 WL 2048350, at *9, *12 (W.D. Pa. 
May 8, 2008) (“the Court’s Senior Law Clerk (serving as the other bailiff) called Mr. Albright [a 
juror] about his condition” and subsequently accompanied him to the emergency room). 
 43. See United States v. Glickman, 604 F.2d 625, 631 n.4 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he original note 
of the trial judge has been lost.  Sometime after trial, the judge’s law clerk attempted to reconstruct 
the content of the note. . . .  At a hearing on June 1, 1978, the trial judge stated that the law clerk’s 
reconstruction ‘doesn’t sound like the note that had been written,’ although he could not recall what 
the note actually said. We assume, Arguendo, that the law clerk’s reconstruction is accurate.”). 
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whether he had seen a certain newspaper article,44 tracking down attor-
neys outside the courthouse,45 searching the courthouse to locate a party 
ordered to attend a hearing,46 spending the night, with a judge, in a jail 
cell (for research purposes),47 observing and recording the actions of a 
criminal defendant during trial,48 explaining the rationale of a judge’s 
decision to counsel,49 assisting a party at trial,50 writing a brief setting out 
                                                 
 44. See United States v. Brasco, 385 F. Supp. 966, 979 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (“Mr. Aponte was 
subsequently interviewed by telephone on October 22, 1974 at approximately 6:00 P.M. and was 
questioned at that time by my law clerk, Mr. Kaplan, in the presence of my other law clerk, Mr. 
Danilow.”). 
 45. See McKnelly v. Sperry Corp., 642 F.2d 1101, 1104 (8th Cir. 1981) (“The court directed 
the clerk to summon counsel.  An attorney for Sperry reported promptly in response to a call, but the 
clerk could not reach McKnelly’s counsel at their hotel number.  A law clerk was sent to search the 
hotel’s lobby and public areas.”). 
 46. See DIRECTV Inc. v. Quintero, No. 04-03623 CW, 2005 WL 901213, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 19, 2005). 
 47. See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D. Mass. 1973) 
(“In addition, with the full cooperation of jail officials, the trial judge and his law clerk took a view 
of nearly every area of the facility and, without advance notice, stayed overnight in a cell.”).  As 
Judge Arthur Garrity reported: 
 When we spent the night there, the wall valve serving as a faucet for the sink in our 
cell jammed while the water was running and we narrowly averted a flood by bailing the 
overflowing sink into the toilet with a small paper cup while our law clerk freed the 
valve, after several unsuccessful attempts, by hammering on it with the heel of his shoe. 
Id. at 680 n.5.  Judge Garrity and his law clerk make the judge and law clerk in Dohner v. McCarthy, 
635 F. Supp. 408 (C.D. Cal. 1985), look like they were on a trip to Club Med, see id. at 411 n.6 
(“My inspection of the units on July 27 included a brief stay in a locked double cell with my law 
clerk.”). 
 As it happens, law clerks—that is, those who have not been convicted of crimes—have made 
their way into the big house more often than one might imagine.  See Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 
300, 303 (7th Cir. 1978) (“The district judge personally visited Pontiac prison, and later appointed a 
law clerk to observe the shakedown procedure.”); Bruscino v. Carlson, 654 F. Supp. 609, 612 (S.D. 
Ill. 1987) (“My law clerks and I made an unannounced visit and toured the institution [Marion Peni-
tentiary] on December 11, 1986.”); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 520 F. Supp. 967, 971 (E.D. Pa. 1981) 
(“On Wednesday, August 19, 1981, I visited Graterford Prison with Daniel D. Pipitone, Esquire, law 
clerk to me . . . .”); Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (“Shortly before 
the trial of this case, the plaintiffs moved that the Judge who presided at this trial ‘view the premis-
es.’  That motion was granted and, in the company of a law clerk and with practically no notice, the 
facility was toured for approximately four hours just a few days before trial.  The time expended was 
ample, since we are no stranger to Lucasville by reason of prior inspections and one ‘on the spot’ 
civil rights case hearing.”); Aikens v. Lash, 371 F. Supp. 482, 485 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (“It is unusual, 
to say the least, for a United States District Court to move its deliberations inside a State Prison wall 
and there to inquire into the practices and proceedings of the institution . . . .  Mention should also be 
made of the fact that our presence there made possible an unannounced inspection trip through the 
two segregation units involved in this controversy.  With the prior knowledge and approval of all 
counsel and flanked only by a law clerk and one prison guide, it was possible for the Judge to walk 
the ‘range’ on both floors of both units, located in separate buildings a short walk from the cour-
troom.”). 
 48. See United States v. Green, 544 F.2d 138, 143 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 49. See Benton-Volvo-Metaire, Inc. v. Volvo Sw., Inc., 479 F.2d 135, 137 n.2 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(“When counsel were asked at oral argument how they arrived at their conclusion that the constitu-
tionality of the statute was critical to the decision below, their only reply was that the district judge’s 
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the arguments against the government’s ex parte request to unseal grand 
jury materials,51 opposing a petition for a writ of mandamus filed in an 
appellate court seeking the law clerk’s judge’s recusal,52 modeling the 
baseball chest protector at issue in a patent-infringement suit,53 demon-
strating the bowl-lifting mechanisms of commercial mixers during trial,54 
witnessing the judicial sale of a ship,55 forwarding documents that ap-
peared to be forgeries to law-enforcement officials,56 mediating pretrial 
disputes,57 questioning counsel on behalf of the court during a claim-
construction hearing in a patent case,58 conducting preliminary pretrial 
conferences,59 or helping a judge to write a poem60 or a song.61  Perhaps 
the most ill-used law clerk I came across in my research was the un-
named amanuensis in Humphreys v. DEA,62 whose judge had a physician 
prescribe controlled substances for him in the names of various court-
                                                                                                             
law clerk had indicated to them that this was what the law clerk thought the judge had considered in 
granting summary judgment.”). 
 50. See Carmalt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 302 F.2d 589, 591 (3d Cir. 1962) (“This 
was a long, hard trial.  The plaintiff insisted on being his own attorney and it appears from the record 
that the only help he would accept was from the judge’s law clerk.”). 
 51. In re Grand Jury Disclosure, 550 F. Supp. 1171, 1174 (E.D. Va. 1982). 
 52. United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 771 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 53. See Everything Baseball v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 611 F. Supp. 2d 832, 834 (N.D. Ill. 
2009). 
 54. See Hobart Corp. v. Welbilt Corp., No. Civ. A. No. 1:98CV1726, 1989 WL 449696, at *2–
*3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 1989). 
 55. See Dynamic Marine Consortium S.A. v. M/V LATINI, 120 F. Supp. 2d 595, 605 (E.D. La. 
1999) (“Dr. Kewalramani’s sale bid in the amount of $1,010,000.00 was in fact made at the March 
25th, 1999 judicial sale and witnessed by all in attendance, including this Court’s law clerk.”). 
 56. See Creek v. Weber, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1014 (D.S.D. 2009). 
 57. See Adams v. United States, No. CV-03-0049-E-BLW, 2007 WL 3208591, at *2 (D. Idaho 
Oct. 29, 2007) (“The court will have its Law Clerk Dave Metcalf continue to mediate disputes.”). 
 58. See Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Chi Mei Optoelecs. Corp., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 
1102 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“Mr. Taub, one of the court’s law clerks at the time, is questioning coun-
sel on behalf of the court in this exchange.”). 
 59. See Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 241 F.R.D. 495, 505 (D. 
Ariz. 2006) (“A second Rule 16 telephonic conference will be held in the above entitled action on 
June 23, 2006 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. before Judge Jorgenson’s law clerk, Kevin Rudh . . . .”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 60. See Omnipoint Comms. Enters., L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 189 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261 n.1 
(E.D. Pa. 2002) (“Appended to this Opinion is a rhyming synopsis of the Telecommunications Act 
claim.  With apologies to Ernest L. Thayer, the author of ‘Casey at the Bat,’ my law clerk, Anna 
Marie Plum, and I adapted the poem to address this issue.”); see also Solomon v. Liberty County, 
957 F. Supp. 1522, 1525 (N.D. Fla. 1997) (beginning the opinion with a poem, titled “Gingles Jin-
gle,” attributed to “Jeana Peeler Hosch, Law [C]lerk to District Judge Robert Propst”). 
 61. In Rimes v. Curb Records, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 984 (N.D. Tex. 2001), all but the introduc-
tory paragraph of the opinion is presented as lyrics to various songs recorded by LeAnn Rimes.  
Judge Jerry Buchmeyer duly noted his collaborator: “Credit for both the words and the lyrics in this 
opinion goes entirely to my law clerk, Elizabeth Falk, who is now a devoted LeAnn Rimes fan.”  Id. 
at 988 n.23. 
 62. 105 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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house employees, including his secretary and law clerk.63  But again, 
beyond the foregoing passing reference in this introduction, cases de-
scribing unusual law-clerk happenings and duties did not make it any 
further into this Article. 
What, then, was I searching for, if not the situations described 
above, or law clerks in wet T-shirts hanging from hotel balconies while 
drinking beer through funnels?  The quintessential law clerk gone wild is 
one who ended up as a participant—or even an issue—in a case on which 
he or she was working, ostensibly behind the scenes, and those cases are 
the subject of Part II.  Part III is devoted to the substantially larger num-
ber of cases in which parties have been rebuffed in their attempts to 
make law-clerk conduct an issue.  Part IV consists of a brief conclusion. 
II.  ONE STEP OVER THE LINE (SWEET LAW CLERK)64 
Now that I have made all the necessary introductions, it is time to 
light this firecracker and take a look at a couple of dozen law clerks who 
have crossed the line by doing things they shouldn’t have, things that had 
an adverse effect on the cases they were working on.  But, and again I 
must apologize for my title, very little of that line-crossing has been in-
itiated by law clerks themselves.  For the most part, when we go wild, it 
is because we have been directed to do so by the judges who employ us.  
That said, I begin with the heartwarmingly small number of cases—
three, count ’em, three—in which law clerks have taken it upon them-
selves to do things they should not have, with definitively detrimental 
results.  (Part-lette II-A, infra, documents additional instances of self-
directed law-clerk misconduct that did not result in reversal or remand).  
Then I turn to the rather larger number of cases in which law clerks have 
veered off into the weeds at the direction of their judges.  My caveat here 
is qualitative; I am not all that interested in cases where a law clerk 
messed up by performing an appropriate duty poorly65—the Article is not 
called “Law Clerks Gone Wrong.”  Rather, my focus in this Part is on 
law clerks who have erred by doing things that they could not have done 
properly under any circumstances, because they fall so far outside the 
law-clerk job description. 
                                                 
 63. Id. at 113. 
 64. I don’t think I’ve got a messiah complex . . . 
 65. See, e.g., Cal. Coast Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Malloy (In re Royal Palms Ret. Ctr.), 201 F.3d 444 
(unpublished table decision), 1999 WL 1021479, at *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 1999) (“Complicating this 
history was the law clerk’s misleading advice as to timing.”); Ham v. Smith, 653 F.2d 628, 630 n.5 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (pointing out inadequacies in law clerk’s letter to a party); Heuss v. Rockwell Std. 
Corp., 495 F.2d 1207, 1209 (6th Cir. 1974) (“While the jury was deliberating, however, the trial 
judge’s law clerk-crier inadvertently delivered a number of exhibits to the jury in an envelope that 
disclosed by label that Travelers was a party plaintiff in the case.”). 
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A. Misguided Initiative 
As noted above, this section—which is the only part of the Article 
that fully and completely delivers on the promise of my title—reports on 
just three cases.  The first two involved trial-court law clerks, the third an 
appellate clerk, so at least there’s something for everyone. 
Riley v. Deeds66 involved a petition for habeas corpus relief under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254.  During the jury deliberations in Raymond Riley’s 
state-court criminal trial, “the jury sent a note to the court requesting a 
readback of [certain] testimony.”67  Here’s what happened next: 
The parties agree the judge was not in the courthouse at the time 
this request was made, and he could not be located.  In the judge’s 
absence, his law clerk convened the court.  He explained to the jury 
that the court reporter would read Leatrice’s testimony from the trial 
transcript, and instructed the foreman to raise his hand when the 
jury had heard enough.  At the conclusion of Leatrice’s direct ex-
amination, the foreman raised his hand and the readback terminated. 
Riley was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison with the 
possibility of parole.  He is currently out on parole.68 
In his petition, Riley argued that he was “entitled to habeas relief 
because the judge’s law clerk, rather than the judge, granted the jury’s 
request to have the victim’s direct examination read back and presided 
during that proceeding.”69  That argument cut no ice with the district 
court,70 but was sufficient to sway the court of appeals.71  As that court 
explained: 
The abuse of discretion standard presupposes the trial judge exer-
cised some judicial discretion in the matter under review.  In this 
case, the judge was not present when the jury requested that the tes-
timony be read back, nor does the record reflect he was consulted 
about the matter.  From what we can tell from the record, the 
judge’s law clerk made the decision to grant the jury’s request to 
read back the testimony. . . . 
When trial testimony is read back to a jury without the judge’s 
approval, outside the judge’s presence and when he is unavailable, 
the error cannot fairly be characterized as mere trial error. . . . 
                                                 
 66. 56 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 67. Id. at 1119. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1122. 
 71. Id. 
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A conviction obtained after a proceeding in which no judge pre-
sided and no judicial discretion was exercised is “abhorrent to dem-
ocratic conceptions of justice.”  Hays v. Arave, 977 F.2d 475, 481 
(9th Cir. 1992). . . .  In short, the error is structural and is not sus-
ceptible to harmless error analysis. 
. . . . 
Nor can we say, as the state urges, that by failing to make a 
timely objection Riley waived his right to object to the readback and 
to the trial judge’s absence from the proceeding.  It is true that no 
contemporaneous objection was made, but that is beside the point.  
There was no opportunity to make any meaningful objection.  To 
whom would the objection have been made?  The law clerk?72 
When serving as a law clerk, being a self-starter can sometimes be a re-
versible error rather than a praiseworthy character trait. 
Kennedy v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,73 an appeal from a 
plaintiffs’ verdict in a slip-and-fall case,74 is another example of law-
clerk initiative run amok.  In that case, Edwin Kennedy sued to recover 
for injuries he received when he fell in a store operated by the defen-
dants.75  Three days into his trial, Kennedy died, from causes other than 
his fall, and the judge declared a mistrial.76  Then, the trial judge’s intre-
pid law clerk sprang into action: 
[S]ome five weeks before the second trial, James Madison, who was 
currently serving the trial judge as his law clerk, and who had heard 
the trial proceedings until the mistrial, decided he would satisfy his 
curiosity by taking a look at the premises.  He passed the store on 
June 6, during a heavy rain.  The following day, while on the way to 
dinner with his date, a Miss Friend, he drove around to the back of 
the store where the entrance was, through which Mr. Kennedy had 
entered the premises, found the door locked but found a crack wide 
enough to permit him to look inside.  Miss Friend also looked in-
side.  They later testified that they both saw a puddle of water on the 
floor near the place where Mr. Kennedy had fallen.77 
The law clerk’s participation in the case continued: 
A few days after the “view,” Madison called on defense counsel and 
told him what he and Miss Friend had seen.  Counsel protested and 
informed Madison that in his opinion, Madison should not have 
                                                 
 72. Id. at 1120–21. 
 73. 551 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 74. Id. at 59394. 
 75. Id. at 594. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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brought the matter to his attention and that he should not disclose 
the matter to the trial judge.  Thereupon, Madison reported that it 
was on the trial judge’s instruction that he had brought the matter to 
the attention of defense counsel with the thought that it might assist 
in effecting a settlement of the case.  Madison also stated that the 
trial judge had instructed him not to inform the plaintiffs’ counsel of 
the matter.78 
Notwithstanding the judge’s hopes for a settlement, the case went to trial 
again.  Remarkably, both the law clerk and his friend, Miss Friend, testi-
fied.79  One of the defendants objected, to no avail.80  More specifically: 
“In response to defendant’s motion that the two witnesses not be permit-
ted to testify, the trial court made comments as to the trustworthiness of 
Mr. Madison to counsel in his chambers which might well have been 
calculated to curb the normal zeal of opposing counsel to conduct search-
ing cross-examination.”  Here is what unfolded at trial: 
Mr. Madison and Miss Friend were called to the witness stand 
on the third day of the trial.  After Madison was sworn, the court 
made the following comment to the jury: 
Members of the jury, Mr. Madison is serving and has 
served since last August as law clerk to this judge.  The 
court instructs you that you should not give any greater or 
any lesser weight to his testimony than you would that of 
any other witness simply because he occupies that position.  
As we told you in qualifying you to sit as jurors in this 
case, that you, and you alone, are the judges of the facts.  
You are the only ones who will make the final determina-
tion of the facts and by applying the laws [that] will be giv-
en to you by the court in its final instructions reach a fair 
and impartial verdict. 
Subsequently at the conclusion of Madison’s testimony, the court 
addressed him and said: “Mr. Madison, just to make it perfectly 
clear, did I request you to go by the store in any way, shape or 
form?”  The witness answered “No, Sir.”  Thereupon, the court 
said: “Did I know anything about it until you reported it to me lat-
er?”  The witness answered, “No, Sir.” 
. . . . 
Subsequently just after Miss Friend was called as a witness and 
was sworn, the court interjected and stated the following: “I want to 
                                                 
 78. Id. at 595. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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tell you that whatever Mr. Madison testified to is not necessarily the 
opinion of the Court.  Even if you think the Court has an opinion on 
the facts that is not binding on you at all.”81 
The court of appeals was not impressed: 
It is impossible to believe that the jury must not have attached 
some special significance to this testimony of the judge’s law clerk 
who stated that he had been in court during the first trial of the case, 
as a result of which his curiosity caused him to have a private view 
of the site of the injury.  Whereas normally, little weight might be 
attached to the condition of the inside of a vacant building some 
twenty-seven months after an accident had occurred when it was 
occupied by a self-service grocery store, the jury must have thought 
that for the judge’s law clerk to take the trouble to go out and see 
the property to satisfy himself about this one fact it must have some 
special importance.  Ordinarily, one who learns about an injury re-
sulting from an accident doesn’t take the trouble to go and look it 
up.  What was the jury to think about this young man’s injecting 
himself into the controversy after having heard the case being tried 
in the court in which he was playing a significant part? 
In addition, there was the imprimatur of character, credibility 
and reliability that was automatically implied as coming from the 
court itself when the trial judge introduced the witness as his present 
law clerk. 
. . . . 
. . . [I]t seems clear that the potential for prejudice to the defen-
dants’ case was too great for us now to conclude that the trial 
court’s overruling of the defendants’ motion to prohibit the testimo-
ny of Mr. Madison and Miss Friend or, in the alternative, to disqua-
lify himself from continuing in the trial was harmless error.82  
                                                 
 81. Id. at 597–98. 
 82. Id. at 598–99.  As the court further elaborated: 
[T]he very fact that the witness was the judge’s law clerk who had heard the evidence pro 
and con at the first trial would, it seems to us, make the cross-examination a very delicate 
matter for defense counsel.  Any challenge of Mr. Madison’s credibility or reliability as a 
reporter of facts would probably be totally unavailable, but more particularly, under our 
adversary system of justice, it was unacceptable that the most damaging evidence against 
the defendants in this case was brought about by the intervention of a court official in the 
accumulation of evidence.  The law clerk learned of the litigation and of the disputed is-
sues by virtue of his employment as law clerk to the trial judge.  It was his duty as much 
as that of the trial judge to avoid any contacts outside the record that might affect the out-
come of the litigation. 
Id. at 596. 
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So, as a public service to any trial-court law clerk who may be read-
ing this Article, I offer this bit of advice: Resist the urge to collect evi-
dence on your own.  Curiosity killed the cat, and it didn’t work out all 
that well for law clerk Madison. 
And from Kennedy, where law clerk Madison got his curious kitty 
in a wringer, I move to what is probably the most high-profile law-clerk 
case of all time, Lamprecht v. FCC.83  While the law-clerk misconduct in 
that case did not have an adverse impact on the case itself, the miscon-
duct was so egregious, and brought the institution of law clerking into 
such disrepute, Lamprecht could only be placed in the section of this Ar-
ticle dedicated to the worst of the worst law-clerk misconduct.  In Lam-
precht, the court invalidated, on constitutional grounds, an FCC policy 
giving preference to female applicants for permits to build radio sta-
tions.84  The court’s opinion was penned by Circuit Justice Clarence 
Thomas.85  While the opinion was being written, drafts of it were leaked 
to the press, prompting Judge James Buckley to comment, in his concur-
rence: 
This litigation deals with a sensitive subject, and it is not sur-
prising that it should have aroused some passions.  Unfortunately, 
this case has also proven the occasion for a most serious breach of 
trust.  I refer to an article that appeared on September 30, 1991, in 
The Legal Times, which purported to report in some detail on the 
contents of preliminary drafts of the majority and dissenting opi-
nions.  The issuance today of those opinions in their final form will 
demonstrate the general accuracy of the information divulged to The 
Legal Times. 
The seriousness of this violation cannot be overstated.  Each 
member of this panel has been aggrieved by it, as have the parties 
who brought this case to us for adjudication.  Moreover, because 
one or more of their number has been guilty of a willful breach of 
trust, this incident must cast a shadow over the dozen or more able 
young law clerks who had become privy to the preliminary drafts.  I 
say “willful” because the information in the published reports was 
too detailed to have been the product of inadvertent disclosures. 
We cannot, of course, repair the damage that may already have 
been done to one or more of the parties as a result of this premature 
disclosure.  But we can and must take steps not only to ensure 
against a repetition in the future, but to demonstrate the seriousness 
with which we take this violation.  I believe the appropriate measure 
                                                 
 83. 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 84. Id. at 383. 
 85. Id. 
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is for this court to initiate a formal investigation in an effort to iden-
tify the source or sources of this disclosure, and I urge my col-
leagues to do so.86 
Judge Buckley was not the only jurist who got worked up over the law-
clerk leakage in Lamprecht. 
In his initial, unpublished opinion in Bishop v. Albertson’s Inc.,87 
which involved a law-clerk-related conflict issue, Judge Robert McNi-
chols wrote: “It does not take a wealth of imagination to appreciate that a 
corrupt law clerk could retire young.”88  Under that statement, he 
dropped this footnote: 
It is amazing the system works.  Judges, magistrates, U.S. At-
torneys and their assistants, and law enforcement personnel all un-
dergo rigorous FBI background checks prior to being entrusted with 
such sensitive information.  Law clerks, like Li’l Abner, merely 
swear to do good and avoid evil.  The case law reflects occasional 
lapses of judgment.  See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust 
Lit., 614 F.2d 958, 967–68 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 
(1980); Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 516 F. Supp. 84, 
88–89 (S.D. Ala. 1980) and authorities cited therein.  But the Court 
is aware of no published decision involving the commission of a 
corrupt act by a law clerk.  That is a better record than judges 
have.89 
After Judge McNichols wrote that footnote, number four, Lamprecht 
came out, and Judge McNichols exhibited just a little bit of judicial 
wildness: 
The memorandum which follows was initially entered on April 
19, 1991.  Trial judges on occasion are tempted to publish dated 
opinions when authority later issues supporting their views; viz., the 
I-wrote-it-first syndrome.  Publication in this case has been prompt-
ed by a quite contrary consideration.  Research in connection with 
another case revealed Lamprecht v. F.C.C., 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 
1992).  Lamprecht establishes conclusively that footnote 4 herein is 
dead wrong.  It was not in April of 1991, but it is now.  Some might 
question burdening the Federal Supplement with material known to 
be flawed, but the purpose of doing so should become apparent in 
due course. 
Whatever one might think of the merits of the controversy 
swirling around Justice Thomas and his confirmation hearing, few 
                                                 
 86. Id. at 403 (Buckley, J., concurring). 
 87. 806 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Wash. 1992). 
 88. Id. at 901. 
 89. Id. at 901 n.4 (parallel citations omitted). 
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fair-minded observers would disagree with the proposition that the 
circus atmosphere cheapened the process by which individuals are 
selected to serve as the final arbiters of the law.  Beyond the process 
itself, some of the participants therein, and the Supreme Court as an 
institution, there was yet another casualty. 
Among the potholes in the road to confirmation was then-Judge 
Thomas’ involvement in a controversial and emotionally charged 
appeal challenging FCC policy in favoring female applicants for 
broadcast licenses.  The policy would ultimately be struck down on 
equal protection grounds.  Lamprecht, supra.  The merits of the de-
cision are of no moment to this discussion, but the procedure which 
attended it is.  The case was argued in January of 1991 and re-
mained under submission during the confirmation hearing.  Chief 
Judge Mikva and Judges Thomas and Buckley already knew what 
the outcome would be and preliminary drafts of the disposition had 
been circulated among the members of the panel.  In keeping with 
standard practice, no one else outside of the three judges’ immediate 
staff should have known. 
Suddenly, everyone knew when the press reported, with stun-
ning accuracy, what the ruling would be and that Judge Thomas 
would author it.  Judge Buckley makes no bones about who leaked 
the preliminary drafts.  It was one of the twelve law clerks working 
for the panel members.  958 F.2d at 403 (Buckley, J., concurring).  
Not only were the drafts released but an unnamed source employed 
by the Court opined that the decision was being “delayed by Judge 
Thomas so as not to imperil his nomination.”  The New York Times, 
Feb. 20, 1992, Section A; Page 1; Column 1.  The nomination was 
already in trouble for reasons too widely publicized to bear reitera-
tion.  That Judge Thomas would put his suspected anti-affirmative 
action views into practice in Lamprecht would not help him in some 
circles.  The accusation that he might delay releasing the opinion to 
serve political ends was even more damaging. 
The scope of possible culprits expanded geometrically when it 
developed that one of Judge Thomas’ law clerks distributed the pre-
liminary drafts to the chambers of other circuit judges not on the 
panel.  The New York Times, Feb. 21, 1992, Section A; Page 12: 
Column 5.  From there, of course, the drafts could have been further 
disseminated by any number of individuals affiliated with the D.C. 
Circuit. 
Judge Buckley describes such leakage as a “willful breach of 
trust” which “cast[s] a shadow” over every law clerk privy to the 
drafts.  958 F.2d at 403.  So it is, and so it does.  The leak could not 
have been motivated by a well-meaning but empty-headed desire to 
enlighten the public as to what the law was or would be.  The  mo-
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tive, rather, could only have been to defeat Judge Thomas’ nomi-
nation.  Judge Buckley goes nowhere near far enough in his charac-
terization or condemnation.  A law clerk who employs his or her 
unique privity with the judicial process in an effort to subvert the 
political process violates the most sacrosanct of canons and is guilty 
of nothing less than official corruption . . . . 
. . . . 
So viewed, footnote 4 is wrong.  With confidence that this sorry 
episode is an example of the exception proving the rule, the follow-
ing nineteen-month-old memorandum will be dusted off and sub-
mitted for publication.90 
The take-away lesson from Lamprecht (and Bishop) seems pretty self-
evident. 
Judge McNichols’ footnote four may be wrong, but not by a great 
margin, even in light of the common perception that the distance between 
zero and one is far greater than the distance between one and two.  That 
is, Riley, Kennedy, and Lamprecht are the only three cases I found in 
which law clerks, acting on their own initiative, have been identified in 
reported cases as having engaged in law-clerk wildness by doing things 
they should not have. 
B. Faulty Guidance 
On the other hand, more than a few law clerks have been identified 
as having done things they should not have on the instructions of the 
judges for whom they worked.  So, while the previous section is aimed 
directly at law clerks, this more extensive collection of cautionary tales 
may prove useful to both law clerks and their judges.  That said, the sto-
ries of judge-guided law-clerk wildness in this section are divided into 
three categories: wildness in dealing with counsel, evidentiary wildness, 
and wildness with juries. 
1. Carousing with Counsel 
In addition to getting a robe and a gavel, the judge also gets the last 
word, but on occasion, some judges have used their words to issue 
marching orders to their law clerks, only to watch their obedient clerks 
march right off the cliff and into the sulfurous abyss of reversible error. 
In Connolly v. National School Bus Service, Inc.,91 Judge George 
Lindberg “ordered the parties to meet with his law clerk in order to me-
                                                 
 90. Id. at 898–99. 
 91. 177 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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diate the dispute.”92  The attorney for one party “refused to allow his 
client to meet with the law clerk,”93 and when the judge reduced that at-
torney’s award of attorney’s fees, he “cited [the attorney’s] refusal to 
mediate as one of the reasons he believed [the attorney] to have unrea-
sonably delayed the disposition of the case.”94  The court of appeals held 
that the attorney “had no obligation to mediate before the judge’s law 
clerk and that reduction of his attorney’s fee award on this basis was 
therefore an abuse of discretion.”95 
The law clerk in Sanders v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.96 did a little 
bit more than the law clerk in Connolley.  In Sanders, Judge James Ide-
man directed his law clerk to preside over a final pretrial conference.97  
At the time the conference was held, the plaintiff was in violation of sev-
eral provisions of the court’s pretrial order.98  After the law clerk “told 
counsel for both parties that the trial date would be vacated and that the 
court would probably set the matter for hearing on an order to show 
cause,”99 Judge Ideman “issued a written order vacating the trial date and 
dismissing the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
41(b).”100  The court of appeals reversed, and, in an opinion by Judge 
Pamela Rymer, explained: 
This is a unique case.  Suffice it to say that where, as here, the dis-
trict judge allows his law clerk to conduct the final pretrial confe-
rence, declines to give counsel an opportunity to be heard before the 
court, and then dismisses the action sua sponte with prejudice, we 
cannot let the dismissal stand. 
                                                 
 92. Id. at 598. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. The court of appeals elaborated: 
 We do not know how common it is for a district court to order parties to mediate 
before a law clerk, but believe the practice to be relatively rare. . . .  [W]e are unable to 
discern from Judge Lindberg’s opinion the frequency with which parties are ordered to 
mediate before his law clerk in his courtroom.  In any case, and regardless of the frequen-
cy with which law clerk mediation is undertaken, we believe the practice to be improper. 
 . . . [W]e do not believe that Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a), which gives district court judges 
the power to conduct pretrial settlement conferences, allows a district court judge to dele-
gate this power to a law clerk.  Law clerks serve as judicial adjuncts.  Their duties and re-
sponsibilities are to assist the judge in his work, not to be the judge.  A judge’s law clerk 
may therefore properly assist the judge in the judge’s settlement efforts, but to allow the 
clerk rather than the judge to conduct a settlement conference is to confuse the adjunct 
with the judge. 
Id. at 598–99. 
 96. 193 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 97. Id. at 1081. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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Counsel was plainly derelict in meeting his Rule 16 obligations, 
but so was the district judge. . . .  Accordingly, we vacate all orders 
entered after the pretrial conference and remand for another district 
judge to consider afresh how to proceed.101 
Judge Ideman is not the only judge to have assigned hearings to his 
law clerks.  In Parker v. Connors Steel Co.,102 the court of appeals held 
that Judge Seybourn Lynne violated 28 U.S.C. § 455 by failing to recuse 
himself when, among other things, his law clerk “held a hearing with 
counsel in the absence of the district judge and later reported the results 
of the hearing to the judge.”103  In the court’s view, “when Somerville 
[the law clerk] held a hearing in Judge Lynne’s absence and later re-
ported the results of the hearing to the judge this contributed to the ap-
pearance of impropriety.”104  While the court ruled that Judge Lynne had 
                                                 
 101. Id. at 1082.  Judge Atsushi Tashima concurred in the majority opinion, but wrote separate-
ly to address an additional point: 
 As the majority opinion points out, the so-called pretrial conference was presided 
over by a law clerk.  I do not believe there can be any doubt that a law clerk cannot pre-
side over a pretrial conference. . . .  A law clerk is not a judicial officer and cannot con-
duct a judicial proceeding, including a final, Rule 16(d) pretrial conference. 
 Judge Ideman must have been aware of these strictures because he appears to have 
taken steps to ensure that the pretrial conference did not become a matter of record.  
There is no entry on the docket of this case, no Clerk’s Minute Order, that a pretrial con-
ference was ever held.  Nor, contrary to the requirement of the Court Reporters Act, 
which requires all proceedings of the district court to “be recorded verbatim,” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 753(b), were the pretrial conference proceedings reported by a court reporter or record-
ed verbatim in any other way.  There simply is no record in the district court that a pretri-
al conference ever took place. 
 Yet, in spite of the sub rosa nature of the pretrial conference, Sanders was visited 
with the ultimate sanction—dismissal of his case with prejudice—because his attorney 
failed to prepare for it.  In my view, the pretrial conference was a nullity.  A law clerk 
purported to preside (undoubtedly at the direction of the judge) over a proceeding from 
which, although held in a district court courtroom, the district judge completely absented 
himself, and which was not reported.  Such a renegade, ultra vires procedure cannot be 
sanctioned. 
Id. at 1082–83. 
 102. 855 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 103. Id. at 1523.  The other factors the court of appeals considered were: (1) the close familial 
relationship (i.e., father/son) between Judge Lynne’s law clerk and a senior partner in a firm 
representing one of the parties in the case, id. at 1524; (2) the fact that the senior partner in question 
had also clerked for Judge Lynne, id.; and (3) the footnote Judge Lynne placed in his order crediting 
his law clerk “for his careful analysis of the massive discovery materials and his countless discus-
sions with the Court as to how the law should be applied to the material facts as to which there is no 
genuine issue,” id. at 1523.  As the court explained: “We express no opinion on whether any of the 
above facts standing alone would rise to the level of a § 455(a) violation.  We merely conclude that 
all of these facts taken together raise the appearance of impropriety and may cause one to reasonably 
question Judge Lynne’s impartiality.”  Id. at 1524–25. 
 104. Id. at 1524. 
194 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:173 
erred by failing to recuse himself, it went on to determine that the error 
was harmless.105 
Trial judges have also been criticized by appellate courts for having 
their law clerks become overly involved in dealing with issues related to 
jury instructions.  In United States v. Sloan,106 the court of appeals had 
this to say: 
The record is silent regarding compliance with this portion of Rule 
30 [which pertains to jury instructions]; however, at oral argument 
counsel agreed that instructions were settled with a law clerk and 
not the judge.  We regard the import of the rule to be plain; that is, 
the judge must resolve all the issues pertaining to the instructions, 
for it is the sole responsibility of the judge to see to it that the jury is 
correctly instructed upon the law.  While this departure from the 
norm has not been raised as error in the case, and thus has no direct 
effect on our decision, it appears to have been a contributing factor 
to the issue with which we deal; thus, we deem it significant enough 
to warrant at least passing comment.107 
And, in Jazzabi v. Allstate Insurance Co.,108 the court of appeals pointed 
out that “at several points during the instruction [session], the court dis-
cussed the substance of the instruction with a law clerk in a way that 
seemed to add to the juror’s uncertainty.”109 
Law-clerk activities of another sort were at issue in Eisemann v. 
Greene.110  Here is what happened: 
After the entry of summary judgment, the parties, both of 
whom had indicated a desire to file a motion for reconsideration, 
contacted the judge’s chambers, and jointly discussed with his law 
clerk the likely bases for their planned motions for reconsideration.  
The conference call with the law clerk was presumably undertaken 
pursuant to Rule 2(b) of the judge’s individual rules . . . .  After dis-
cussing the basis for each motion, the law clerk, purporting to speak 
on behalf of the judge, granted permission to file the motions but 
advised both counsel that all grounds for reconsideration, with the 
exception of one argument advanced by defense counsel, did not 
appear “reasonably likely” to comply with the governing standards 
for filing motions for reconsideration under Rule 6.3 of the Local 
Rules of the United States District Court for the Southern and East-
ern Districts of New York.  The judge’s law clerk also warned that 
                                                 
 105. Id. at 1526. 
 106. 811 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 107. Id. at 1362 n.2. 
 108. 278 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 109. Id. at 987. 
 110. 204 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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the filing of any frivolous motion would result in sanctions.  Eise-
mann’s attorney nevertheless filed his motion for reconsideration.  
Defendant responded to the Eisemann motion by filing a “motion 
for sanctions for having to respond to plaintiff’s frivolous motion 
for reconsideration.”  The District Court granted defendant’s motion 
and imposed a sanction of $1000 on Eisemann’s counsel, pursuant 
to both 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s “inherent supervisory 
power.”111 
The court gave two reasons for imposing sanctions, Eisemann’s 
counsel’s bad faith and “the fact that counsel ‘persisted’ with his motion 
for reconsideration after he had been forewarned by the Judge’s law 
clerk during the telephone conference that counsel’s contentions were on 
their face inappropriate for reconsideration.”112  The court of appeals re-
versed, based upon the trial court’s failure to “make sufficiently specific 
factual findings to support its conclusion that Eisemann’s motion for re-
consideration, or any other motion filed in the course of this litigation, 
was ‘entirely without color and . . . taken for reasons of harassment or 
delay or for other improper purposes.’”113  The court also noted that “im-
posing sanctions, in part, for failing to heed the Court’s ‘advice’ as to 
whether a motion is appropriate amounts to establishing an unacceptable 
requirement that parties obtain the Court’s prior authorization before fil-
ing a motion.”114  Regarding the law clerk’s participation in giving the 
court’s “advice,” the court had this to say: 
Indeed, we have noted that holding pre-motion conferences with a 
judge “may serve the useful purpose of narrowing and resolving 
conflicts between the parties and preventing the filing of unneces-
sary papers.”  Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 
647, 652 (2d Cir. 1987), but we have not encouraged—and do not 
now consider—the practice of having litigants confer on the merits 
of cases with law clerks or other chambers personnel.115 
If, however, the court had considered the practice of having litigants con-
fer on the merits of their cases with law clerks, it is not difficult to im-
agine the (negative) view it would take. 
Finally, in Johnson v. Schmidt,116 the issue was not so much dealing 
with counsel, but being the counsel.  In that case, “Judge [Charles] Wolle 
                                                 
 111. Id. at 395 (footnotes omitted). 
 112. Id. at 396. 
 113. Id. at 396–97 (quoting Dow Chem. Pac. v. Rascator Mar. S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 344 (2d Cir. 
1986)). 
 114. Id. at 397. 
 115. Id. at 397 n.4. 
 116. 83 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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requested two pro se law clerks employed by the District Court for the 
Eastern District to assist [Jonathan] Johnson as ‘standby counsel,’ his 
request for appointed counsel having been previously denied.”117  The 
court of appeals gave a ringing un-endorsement of Judge Wolle’s ap-
proach to providing standby counsel for Johnson: 
Since a new trial is required, we take this occasion to express 
serious concern about the District Judge’s enlistment of two court 
employees to act as standby counsel for appellant.  The designation 
of standby counsel has been authoritatively approved, see Faretta 
[v. California], 422 U.S. [806,] 835 n.46 [(1975)]; see also McKas-
kle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178–79 (1984) (delineating role of 
standby counsel).  But the use of court employees to fill that role is 
at best a dubious practice.  If the employment relationship comes to 
the attention of the jurors, as it did here, there are risks of prejudice 
either for or against the pro se litigant.  The jurors might think that 
the Court is somehow siding with the party whom the court em-
ployee is assisting.  On the other hand, the jurors might think the 
Court is belittling the worth of the pro se litigant’s case by assign-
ing as standby counsel a court employee, rather than a lawyer unaf-
filiated with the Court, as would normally occur.  There is also the 
further risk that a pro se litigant’s subsequent displeasure with the 
advice of standby counsel, whether justified or not, places the liti-
gant in the awkward position of asking the Court to assess the per-
formance of one of its own employees. 
In the pending case, standby counsel were two employees of the 
District Court’s pro se office.  Though such employees frequently 
give helpful advice to pro se litigants concerning the general proce-
dures to follow in filing a complaint or motion, or taking an appeal, 
it is quite beyond their appropriate role to render specific advice to a 
litigant concerning the variety of legal issues that arise in the course 
of a trial.  Moreover, pro se law clerks are often young attorneys, 
lacking any significant trial experience. 
We can appreciate that the limited availability of counsel will-
ing to accept court appointment in civil cases or to act as standby 
counsel might sometimes prompt a District Court to enlist the aid of 
a court employee to act as standby counsel for a pro se litigant, but 
we strongly recommend against use of such personnel for this pur-
pose.118 
Practice makes perfect, it is said, but for law clerks, practicing law 
is an imperfection to be avoided. 
                                                 
 117. Id. at 38. 
 118. Id. at 40 (parallel citations omitted). 
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2. Evidentiary Wildness 
At least one law clerk has been driven by his or her judge to partic-
ipate in an evidentiary mishap. 
In Espinoza v. Dunn,119 four sheriff’s deputies appealed a jury ver-
dict against them in a civil-rights action.  In so doing, they challenged 
various evidentiary rulings made by the trial judge.120  One of the issues 
in the case was one plaintiff’s behavior once he had been handcuffed and 
placed inside a police car.  The plaintiff testified that “he kicked at the 
inside of the car door and hit it with his shoulders,” after he saw officers 
strike his pregnant sister with a flashlight.121  Then, he testified, officers 
entered the car, tied his legs to his handcuffs, took him out of the car and 
repeatedly dropped him on the pavement from a height of three to four 
feet, and, finally, hit him in the head with a flashlight, causing him to 
lose consciousness.122  For their parts, the defendant deputies123 testified 
that “after [the plaintiff] was placed in the car, he began hitting his head 
against the passenger window and the rear window” and that they “re-
moved him from the car to keep him from damaging it or himself.”124  In 
the face of that contradictory testimony, Judge Spencer Letts took a ra-
ther unusual step: 
After the conclusion of most of the deputies’ testimony, the 
court asked defendants if they could bring to the court building a car 
similar to the one in which Gilbert had been placed.  The next court 
day, when defendants had done so, the trial judge explained that he 
wanted his law clerk to sit in the car and form an opinion as to 
whether there would be any value in having the jury view it.125 
In response to various defense objections to the demonstration, the judge 
stated: “I will not tolerate before me testimony that is not objectively 
possible.  I will test what is objectively possible.”126  Here is what hap-
pened next: 
The next court day, the trial judge discussed logistics with de-
fense counsel, explaining that he would orchestrate the viewing and 
that a law clerk would perform the demonstration. . . . 
At some point, whether on that same day or earlier, the law 
clerk performed a preliminary inspection of the car, and was unable 
                                                 
 119. 48 F.3d 1227 (unpublished table decision), 1995 WL 21601 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 1995). 
 120. Id. at *1. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Not to be confused with deputy defendants, which are something else altogether. 
 124. 48 F.3d 1227, 1995 WL 21601, at *1. 
 125. Id. at *2. 
 126. Id. 
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to strike her head against the rear window.  The trial judge thereaf-
ter informed the jurors that there would be a demonstration.  He told 
them that he had decided that it would be “unnecessarily difficult” 
for them to consider the evidence relating to Gilbert’s arrest and 
placement in the car without seeing the car and seeing somebody in 
the car.  The judge also explained that one purpose of the demon-
stration was to attempt to refresh the deputies’ memories, but that 
the jurors should not, in their own minds, put the deputies on the 
spot.  Finally, the court described some limitations on the scope of 
the demonstration.  There would be no attempt to reproduce the 
struggle, and there would be no effort to reproduce “the manner of 
putting down,” in part because the testimony on this point was not 
altogether consistent. 
The demonstration was held in a parking garage.  On site, the 
court explained to the jury that the law clerk was roughly the same 
size as Gilbert had been at the relevant time.  The court also ex-
plained that the clerk would not be doing any kicking or thrashing, 
although “there [wa]s testimony about a lot of kicking and a lot of 
thrashing.”  The clerk then put her hands behind her back, got into 
the car, and attempted to bang her head against the rear window.  
Apparently she was unable to do so.  The court invited any defen-
dant whose memory had been refreshed to add to his testimony.  In-
stead, defense counsel handcuffed Deputy Okamoto, who got into 
the car and banged his head against the rear window.  The court 
asked if the jurors had taken note, pointing out that “the place the 
head struck” was an area of “potential conflict,” and noting that 
Deputy Okamoto was taller than the law clerk. 
The clerk then got back into the car.  The court again asked the 
deputies if their recollection was refreshed, and pointed to positions 
around the car where the deputies, consistent with their testimony, 
would have been standing on the night of the incident.  The clerk 
was lifted out of the car by two fellow clerks; according to defense 
counsel, she lay limply in their arms.  She was placed on the 
ground; the positions of the deputies around her were indicated; she 
was told to kick.  Defense counsel posited that the bulk of the kick-
ing had taken place in the air.  Soon thereafter, the demonstration 
ended.127 
The jury returned a plaintiffs verdict.128  The court of appeals reversed, 
identifying two problems with the demonstration.  First, the court noted a 
glaring and dispositive dissimilarity between the demonstration and the 
                                                 
 127. Id. at *2–*3 (footnote, citations to the record omitted). 
 128. Id. at *1. 
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events it was intended to depict, namely, the judge’s instruction to the 
law clerk not to “kick and thrash.”129  As the court explained: 
[W]hile plaintiffs argue that the head-banging demonstration was 
damaging but fair, since it merely revealed the falseness of the dep-
uties’ testimony, in fact the dissimilarity may have lead the jurors to 
erroneously conclude that the deputies’ version of the events was 
physically impossible.  Quite simply, while a stationary law clerk 
could not bang her head on the rear window, a clerk thrashing about 
as Gilbert allegedly did might well have been able to do so.  If so, 
the inference the jurors were invited to draw (i.e., that the deputies 
were lying) would have been incorrect.130 
Then, the court identified a second problem, the fact the judge “was un-
willing to perform the demonstration without first determining what the 
results of the experiment were likely to be,” by means of his law clerk’s 
“pre-screening.”131  That, according to the court of appeals, placed the 
judge more in “the role of an advocate, not a judge,”132 and constituted 
reversible error.133 
3. Getting Jiggy with the Jury 
From time to time, law clerks—at the behest of their judges—have 
crossed over the line in their dealings with juries. 
On the front end of the jury process, Judge Paul Cassell conducted 
a somewhat unusual voir dire in United States v. Visinaiz.134  Specifical-
ly, with his approval, “counsel and court personnel determined the pe-
remptory challenges.”135  While the court of appeals found no reversible 
error,136 it did mention “the unusual practice of having court staff handle 
the peremptory challenges,”137 and dropped this footnote: “We do note 
                                                 
 129. Id. at *4. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at *6. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. 428 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 135. Id. at 1313.  In the meantime, he (the judge) decided to “take advantage of the captive 
audience” for the ten minutes he expected the process to take.  Id.  He then discussed federal juris-
diction; the nature and size of his caseload; Utah federal court personnel; his teaching activities; a 
new federal courthouse; and a lawsuit that might involve historic preservation, civil-case manage-
ment, and other matters with the jury, all the while asking counsel—at least four times—about their 
progress.  Id. (citation to the record omitted). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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that reliance on law clerks or other court personnel to handle the peremp-
tory challenges with the attorneys is generally considered improper.”138 
Standard Alliance Industries, Inc. v. Black Clawson Co.139 involved 
law-clerk involvement at the back end of the jury process.  In that case, 
“trial on liability was separated from trial on damages; the same jury, 
however, was to hear both.”140  Black Clawson contended that “imme-
diately after the liability verdict, Standard Alliance’s counsel improperly 
approached two jurors as they were approaching an elevator in the Fed-
eral Courthouse and thanked them for their verdict.”141  Then: 
Black Clawson claimed improper contact and promptly filed a mo-
tion for mistrial, with accompanying affidavits as to what had trans-
pired.  Instead of summoning the attorneys and interrogating the ju-
rors on the record or otherwise proceeding to openly test the validity 
of the motion, the district court, without notice to either party, sent 
his law clerk to interview the jurors about the alleged incident.  The 
court concluded, on the basis of this ex parte communication, that 
any jury contact which had taken place had been trivial.142 
While noting that resolution of that issue was unnecessary to its deci-
sion,143 the court of appeals was concerned enough to write about it any-
way, pointing out that “[e]x parte contact between judge and jury raises a 
presumption of reversible error,”144 and concluding: 
Here, the length and nature of the law clerk’s contact with the jury 
is unknown.  No record was kept, not [sic] notice was given to the 
parties.  Under these circumstances, the presumption of prejudicial 
error cannot be rebutted.  This alone would have required reversal, 
at least of the damages verdict rendered by the same jury after the 
incident took place.145 
The lesson of this section is that any law-clerk interaction outside 
chambers, especially those with attorneys and jurors, can be pretty risky 
business. 
                                                 
 138. Id. at 1313 n.4 (citing Glenn v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 32 F.3d 1462, 1464 (10th Cir. 1994); 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)). 
 139. 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 140. Id. at 828. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 828–29. 
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II-A. NO HARM, NO FOUL 
It is difficult to imagine that there is a judge alive who has not, 
from time to time, given thanks for the doctrine of harmless error.  In this 
Part-lette, I describe several stern finger wags directed toward law-clerk 
acts that were bad enough to constitute error, but were committed in cir-
cumstances that rendered the error harmless. 
In In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation,146 the defen-
dants in a civil antitrust action sought recusal of the judge assigned to the 
case for a variety of reasons, several of which flowed from the fact that 
he had previously presided over a criminal case in which one of them 
had been a defendant.147  Relevant to this Article, the defendants argued 
that the judge was disqualified because, after the criminal trial, his law 
clerk had “told an attorney representing [one of the defendants] in sub-
stance that defendants did not deserve to win the criminal trial and that 
plaintiffs’ counsel in the civil cases would do a better job than the gov-
ernment counsel did in the criminal cases,”148 and had given comments to 
a representative of a trade magazine that ended up in print.149  The court 
of appeals held that the law clerk’s comments did not disqualify the 
judge for whom she worked,150 but cast a jaundiced eye toward the ac-
tions of the law clerk, questioning the propriety of her post-trial com-
ments to counsel,151 and opining that by giving an interview to the press, 
she probably breached her duties under Canons 3 A(6) and B(2) of the 
Federal Code of Judicial Conduct.152 
The law clerk in Knop v. Johnson,153 at the request of his or her 
judge, made several telephone calls to a witness for the plaintiffs, to col-
lect “further background materials”154 concerning “the impact on Prison 
Legal Services of frequent prisoner transfers necessitated by overcrowd-
ing,”155 a matter on which the judge had solicited a memorandum from 
the witness at trial.156  On the basis of the law clerk’s telephone calls, the 
defendant moved for a new trial.157  The court of appeals affirmed the 
trial court’s denial of the motion.158  It noted the impropriety of a judge 
                                                 
 146. 614 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 147. Id. at 962–63. 
 148. Id. at 968 n.20. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 968. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. (citing United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). 
 153. 977 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 154. Id. at 1011. 
 155. Id. at 1010. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 1011. 
202 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:173 
directing a law clerk to have ex parte communications, but determined 
that the judge’s error in that case was “relatively harmless” because the 
recipient of the law clerk’s requests was scrupulous in providing counsel 
for the other side with copies of her letters responding to the judge’s re-
quests for information.159  In United States v. Loya,160 jury instructions 
were presented to counsel during “an informal conference presided over 
by the district court’s law clerk,”161 and “[n]o objection was made to the 
fact that the law clerk presided over the conference on instructions.”162  
While the court of appeals had “serious questions as to the constitutional-
ity of the procedure employed by the district court,”163 the instructions 
ultimately given “did not result in prejudicial error.”164 
United States v. Kabir165 involved a colorful set of facts: 
During the trial, just prior to final arguments and the giving of 
jury instructions by the district court, the trial judge advised counsel 
for the defendants that a juror had informed her law clerk that two 
women on the jury expressed concern because they believed the de-
fendants were sketching them.  Defendants’ counsel presented the 
court with various papers demonstrating that the defendants had in 
fact been engaged in what the court then described for the record as 
“standard doodlings.”  The judge then asked counsel whether it 
would be proper for her clerk, who had received the information 
originally, to explain to the jury that “doodling” was all that was in-
volved.  The district judge then, without objection, requested her 
clerk to “explain that to the jury” and to “[g]ive them the standard 
instruction.” 
Later, Batin with whom Kabir joined, moved for a mistrial 
based upon the jurors’ concerns or, in the alternative, for a voir dire 
of the jurors to determine their state of mind.  The law clerk, called 
into the courtroom to explain what had transpired, related that she 
                                                 
 159. Id. 
 160. 807 F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 161. Id. at 1490. 
 162. Id. at 1491. 
 163. Id. at 1492.  Judge George Lindberg harbored no such concerns in United States v. 
D’Arco, No. 90 CR 1043, 1992 WL 121603 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 1992), in which he wrote: 
 Defendant contends that the preliminary jury instruction conferences conducted by 
his law clerk violated defendant’s constitutional rights and were an impermissible delega-
tion of Article III power. 
 The court was entitled to the assistance of his law clerk during the preliminary jury 
instruction conferences.  Defendant had ample opportunity on the record to make his ar-
guments and object to each and every instruction tendered at the jury instruction confe-
rence with the court.  Defendant’s Article III objection is frivolous. 
Id. at *16. 
 164. Loya, 807 F.3d at 1493. 
 165. 865 F.2d 261 (unpublished table decision), 1988 WL 138963 (6th Cir. Dec. 28, 1988). 
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had been told by a gentleman on the jury that some of the women 
jurors found the perceived sketching to be “somewhat intimidating.”  
The district court deferred action until after a verdict was returned.  
She instructed the jurors, however, to base their verdict “solely on 
the testimony and evidence in the case, without prejudice or sympa-
thy,” making no direct reference to the sketching incident.166 
The jury returned guilty verdicts, and “the defendants moved for a new 
trial, arguing that members of the jury had been intimidated by their mi-
sapprehension that the defendants were sketching them.”167  The trial 
judge then conducted a voir dire,168 and denied the motion.  On appeal, 
the defendants challenged, among other things, the manner in which the 
trial court handled the issue of jury bias.169  The court of appeals “perce-
ive[d] no constitutional deficiency in the manner in which [the trial 
judge] chose to proceed,”170 but also said: “[W]e do not approve the dis-
trict court’s use of her law clerk in regard to jury contact.”171 
Jury contact was also at issue in United States v. Griffith.172  In that 
case, after the jury retired to deliberate, “the trial judge’s law clerk was 
sworn as the bailiff.”173  Less than two hours into its deliberations, the 
jury asked the law clerk for a dictionary, which he or she provided, 
“without the consent or knowledge of the judge or counsel.”174  Shortly 
thereafter, Judge Stewart Newblatt shifted into full damage-control 
mode: 
When the judge learned what had occurred, the law clerk was or-
dered to retrieve the dictionary.  The judge then notified all counsel 
of the problem. 
The judge sent a note to the jury room inquiring why the dictio-
nary had been requested.  The foreman sent a note to the judge indi-
cating that the jury wished to define the word “organized.”  The 
judge then responded with a note admonishing the jury to consider 
no materials other than the evidence and instructions presented and 
to disregard anything they read in the dictionary. 
After the jury completed their deliberations but before they 
were dismissed, the court conducted an in-chambers voir dire of 
each juror in order to determine what use had been made of the dic-
                                                 
 166. Id. at *2–*3. 
 167. Id. at *3. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at *4. 
 171. Id. 
 172. 756 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 173. Id. at 1250. 
 174. Id. 
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tionary.  The court determined that a juror had looked up and read 
aloud the definition of “organization” and “organize.”  Half of the 
jurors indicated that they had not heard the definitions.  None of the 
jurors indicated that he or she had been influenced by the definitions 
or had failed to rely on the instructions.175 
While the court of appeals had little trouble concluding that the jury’s 
use of the dictionary was error,176 it ultimately ruled that Judge Newblatt 
did not abuse his discretion by denying the defendant’s motion for a mi-
strial, and based its decision, in large measure, on Judge Newblatt’s ex-
tensive efforts to cure the error.177 
An overly helpful law clerk also created a spot of trouble in United 
States v. LaSpesa,178 by answering a juror’s question when a politely 
zipped lip would have been a better response.  In that case, three jurors 
were playing cards during a recess in the trial, and the district judge’s 
law clerk went into the jury room to fill a water pitcher.179  Then: 
One of the jurors asked the law clerk whether, if appellants were 
convicted, they had a right to appeal.  The clerk replied, “Normally, 
if the government loses, that’s the end of the case.  There’s no right 
of appeal for the government.  But if the defendants should lose, 
they have a right of appeal as a matter of right.”180 
Like Judge Newblatt in Griffith, Judge Walter Hoffman notified counsel 
of his law clerk’s contact with the jury.  And, like Judge Newblatt, Judge 
Hoffman denied the defendants’ motion for a mistrial.181  While deeming 
the law clerk’s remark “improper,”182 the court of appeals held “that the 
district court adequately investigated the possibility of prejudice from the 
law clerk’s remarks and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a 
mistrial.”183  In so holding, the court determined that “[t]he district court 
properly found that the clerk’s remarks were not sufficiently prejudicial 
to justify a mistrial,”184 and also pointed out the court’s instruction that 
the jury “was not to consider matters relating to the ultimate disposition 
of the case, nor any extraneous comments heard outside the trial con-
text.”185 
                                                 
 175. Id. at 1250–51. 
 176. Id. at 1251. 
 177. Id. at 1252. 
 178. 956 F.2d 1027 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 179. See id. at 1032. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1034 n.4. 
 183. Id. at 1033–34. 
 184. See id. at 1033. 
 185. Id. 
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I conclude this Part-lette with another colorful fact pattern that pret-
ty much speaks for itself: 
In its first point of error, Bayou Fleet claims that it was denied 
its First Amendment right of access to the courts because of a law 
clerk’s improper participation in the non-jury trial.  Bayou Fleet 
claims that the law clerk directed the district judge during the course 
of proceedings to the extent that the law clerk effectively presided 
over the trial.  It argues that the law clerk’s participation denied it 
meaningful access to the courts. 
Bayou Fleet points to several instances in the trial record that it 
claims are representative of the law clerk’s leading role in the pro-
ceedings.  First, the law clerk interrupted the judge regarding the 
time when the judge could rule on a motion.  After the judge ans-
wered an attorney’s question regarding the time when he would rule 
on a motion, the law clerk interjected stating, “Judge, there is no 
way we can rule on it by 1:30 today because I am sitting in the cour-
troom right now.”  To which the judge replied to counsel, “It will 
have to be later.” 
Second, Bayou Fleet complains that the law clerk questioned 
witnesses and corrected the judge’s ruling on the defendants’ mo-
tion for summary judgment.  The judge stated that the motion for 
summary judgment was denied, and the law clerk interrupted stat-
ing, “Judge, it’s not the merits that are denied, it’s denied because 
they set it after trial.  The merits of the motion will be addressed in 
the opinion.”  Bayou Fleet argues that this exchange clearly indi-
cates that the law clerk was ruling on the motion instead of the 
judge. 
Finally, Bayou Fleet points out that the judge interrupted court 
for two days so the law clerk could travel out of town to visit her 
mother.  Bayou Fleet alleges that the court’s decision to postpone 
the trial suggests that the judge was incapable of presiding over the 
trial without the law clerk present. 
The [defendants] insist that Bayou Fleet has taken the law 
clerk’s behavior out of context.  The [defendants] assert that the 
judge intervened and ruled on objections throughout the trial with-
out the clerk’s assistance.  They claim that, in any event, after two 
years of pretrial proceedings that culminated in several published 
and unpublished opinions, Bayou Fleet cannot convincingly argue 
that it was denied access to the courts.186 
                                                 
 186. Bayou Fleet, Inc. v. Alexander, 234 F.3d 852, 857 (5th Cir. 2000) (footnote omitted). 
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After ruling that “Bayou Fleet was not denied meaningful access to the 
courts,” the court of appeals concluded: “We . . . can not say that in this 
case that staff usurped the judge’s role in the decision-making process of 
the trial. The involvement of the judge’s law clerk in the trial was unfor-
tunate and the judge should take whatever action is necessary to make 
sure that it does not recur.”187  I can’t quite decide whether the judge (and 
law clerk) in Bayou Fleet dodged a bullet, or avoided reversal by the 
skin(s) of their teeth.  Or both. 
IV.  NOT SO FAST SCHMEDLAP 
It takes a certain amount of chutzpah188 for a litigant or an attorney 
to go mano a mano with a judge, and given the well-understood ineffica-
cy of vinegar as fly bait,189 most attorneys understand that criticism of a 
decision maker is rarely a useful prelude to a prayer for relief from that 
selfsame decision maker.190  Those considerations, in conjunction with 
Judge Learned Hand’s famous description of his law clerks as “puny 
judges,”191 may explain why it is not so uncommon for an attorney to 
attempt to gain an advantage by taking aim not at the judge in his or her 
case, but at the judge’s unrobed mini-me.192  This Part is devoted to opi-
nions in cases in which attorneys have pointed to law clerks and said, 
                                                 
 187. Id. at 858. 
 188. “Chutzpah” is Yiddish for “cajones.”  When I wrote that sentence, I thought I was being 
clever and original.  But then I found this: “In US slang, cojones denotes ‘brazen, brave attitude’, 
pronounced /kəhonez/ and /kəhunəz/ in English.  Contextually, its usage is like that of the 
Yiddish chutzpah (nerve) and the Finnish sisu (perseverance).  A common euphemistic mis-spelling 
of cojones is cajones (furniture ‘drawers’ and ‘wooden box drums’, see cajón).”  WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cojones (last visited Aug. 5, 2010).  Damn you, Wikipedia. 
 189. See Parker B. Potter, Jr., Dropping the K-Bomb: A Compendium of Kangaroo Tales from 
American Judicial Opinions, 11 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 9, 19 & n.60 (2006). 
 190. It is hard to imagine how the advocate who made the following statement, in an affidavit, 
thought the statement would help his client: “It is our information and belief that the Judge before 
entering the order of dismissal informed his law clerk that he intended to dismiss the cause and in-
structed the law clerk to find some basis for the decision.”  Investors Thrift Corp. v. Sexton, 347 F. 
Supp. 1207, 1212 (W.D. Ark. 1972).  One also wonders just what was the basis for the affiant’s 
information and belief. 
 191. Nadine J. Wichern, Comment, A Court of Clerks, Not of Men: Serving Justice in the Me-
dia Age, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 621, 634 (1999) (citing GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN 
AND THE JUDGE 141 (1994)).  For his part, “Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes . . . termed law clerks 
‘puisne judges.’”  Bear v. Potter, 89 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (W.D.N.C. 1999) (quoting Fredonia 
Broad. Corp. v. RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251, 255 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds by Ri-
quelme Valdes v. Leisure Res Group, Inc., 810 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1987)).  Given the choice, I’d 
rather be thought of as “puisne” than “puny.”  But that’s just me. 
 192. You will have to agree, I am sure, that the mental image inspired by the phrase “unrobed 
mini-me” is far less disturbing than the one conjured by the phrase “disrobed mini-me.”  (No offense 
intended, Mr. Troyer.) 
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“J’accuse,” only to be told by a judge, “Not so fast, Schmedlap.”193  Spe-
cifically, I consider four kinds of unsuccessful challenges based upon 
law clerk attributes or actions: challenges to the institution as a whole, 
attempts at law-clerk shopping, charges of misconduct (i.e., charges that 
a law clerk did something outside his or her job description), and charges 
of incompetence (i.e., charges that a law clerk undertaking a permitted 
activity simply did it poorly). 
A.  Institutional Challenges 
Notwithstanding all the insulation placed between law clerks and 
the litigants and attorneys who appear before their judges,194 some enter-
prising litigants have attacked the institution of clerkship itself, suggest-
ing that it has somehow tainted or diluted the justice they have re-
ceived.195  That argument is just about always DOA.196 
                                                 
 193. A particularly illustrative “not so fast” came from the pen of Judge Bailey Brown in Blan-
ton v. United States, in his explanation of the maxim that “possession of a law license does not a 
‘counsel’ make.”  896 F. Supp. 1451, 1460 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).  In the words of Judge Brown: 
 The Petitioner’s attorney provides a perfect example.  In his memorandum to this 
court, he states: 
Counsel wishes to inform the Court that the Court has misread United States 
v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1976).  Whitesel is clearly factually dis-
tinguishable, and the relevant dicta supports Petitioner.  From the Court’s 
comments at the hearing, Petitioner’s counsel can only believe the Court’s 
law clerk read only the West’s Publishing Company’s “headnotes”, [sic] par-
ticularly note 2, and the Court, in reliance upon the law clerk’s representa-
tions, then cited the case to Petitioner’s counsel. 
R. Doc. No. 157 at 8 (emphasis added). 
 This is an unusual sort of advocacy.  Most attorneys would not attempt to win their 
case by libeling the judge who decides it.  The petitioner’s attorney has done just that, 
though, and his law license did not provide him with the wisdom to refrain.  Of course, 
the above quotation is bewildering rather than prejudicial, but it is nevertheless not some-
thing one would expect from a competent advocate. 
Id. 
 194. As an example of that insulation, Magistrate Judge David Wall once barred counsel in a 
case from making telephonic contact with chambers because the attorney for one side phoned, after 
hours, saying “that she ‘would very much like the law clerk who wrote the order dated the 18th to 
call [her] briefly to speak with [her] about it.’”  Macaluso v. Keyspan Energy, No. CV 05-
0823(ADS)(WDW), 2007 WL 1041662, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2007).  In Kingston Square Te-
nants Ass’n v. Tuskegee Gardens, Ltd., 792 F. Supp. 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1992), another attorney exhi-
bited spectacularly substandard telephone manners: “Following the ruling, counsel for the Plaintiffs 
engaged in ex parte telephonic communication with chambers, wherein she unjustifiably accused the 
undersigned of abdicating his judicial responsibilities to his law clerk.  Such allegations are un-
founded and this type of behavior shall not be tolerated in the future.”  Id. at 1570 n.1. 
 195. See, e.g., Switzer v. Coan, 261 F.3d 985, 987 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of 
claims under Bivens and RICO based on allegations that plaintiff was “the victim of a denial of 
meaningful access to the courts and [an] obstruction of justice conspiracy perpetrated by the defen-
dants because of his status as a pro se litigant in that Orders and Opinions issued by the defendant 
Article III judges are actually authored by the defendant staff attorneys and law clerks and signed by 
the defendant Article III judges who have not bothered to read what their clerks and staff attorneys 
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In Smith v. Campbell,197 a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the 
petitioner opined that he had been prejudiced by the work of a magistrate 
judge’s law clerk: 
Magistrate Sandridge [sic] has long suffered from physical dis-
abilities of vision.  He sees only in winks and blinks, as lightning in 
a night[’]s storm, it is reflected in his Recommendation and opi-
nions as follows, denying your petitioner his full day in court.  Fact 
from fiction: Many here have complained on the Magistrate.  This 
petitioner’s work is definitive and distinctive, and please credit me 
accordingly with what I submit to this Honorable Court.  It has been 
contended that Mr. Sandidge, the magistrate, is “beyond” the poten-
tial to properly analyze & review cases that contain in depth factors 
relating to numerous issues.  While I do not conclusively think that 
his analytic capabilities are impaired or handicapped by his age & 
mental state, I know that an unconstitutional process produced the 
magistrate’s decision.  Could some law clerk have interjected too 
much influence in this case?198 
                                                                                                             
have written.”); Budrow v. McCalla, 21 F. App’x 315, 316 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of 
habeas corpus petition in case when petitioner, on appeal, “cast[ ] aspersions on the authorship of the 
district court’s opinion and claims to have been denied due process of law because her case was 
assigned to a law clerk or staff attorney”). 
 196. See, e.g., Tollestrup v. Tel Am. Long Distance, 95 F. App’x 290, 293 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(“Ms. Tollestrup’s argument that the district court’s decision was drafted by a law clerk is of no 
significance.  Nothing in the record suggests the district court judge did not participate in the deci-
sion.”). 
 197. 781 F. Supp. 521 (M.D. Tenn. 1991). 
 198. Id. at 525 n.3.  If not definitive, petitioner Smith’s style of argument was plainly distinc-
tive: 
 Your petitioner scopes the totality of the Majestrates [sic] opinion and recommen-
dations as a whole and avers it echoes the Hellenized—akin to harmony—of the Tennes-
see justice system that it is wanting, and is 3000 years behind the times and as dead as 
ancient Greece where it was born and died according to its ways of underminding [sic] 
truth and holiness in justice, and the citizens of state. 
 Notwithstanding a Hellenized justice system of Greece put to death Socrates, Anax-
agoras and Anaxagoras [sic] three of the greatest thinkers in the Pericean age.  For reli-
gious reasons, solely, as, in Tennessee courts akin to harmony, hearing-only-what they 
want to hear-in-a matter.  Being fiction and not truth before them. 
 This is 1991, and your petitioner has long awaited his day in court.  Expecting a 
1776 Constitutional day, a 200 year old Bill of Rights in 1991 to unfold, and what does 
he get, not even a English type due process, nor the holiness of scripture law of the San-
hedrin court of Israel our constitution was molded after, but, as, found a decision as, if, 
out of Greece 3000 years ago, Rome 1900 years ago or even France before the revolu-
tion. 
 We have here as Egyptian inscription-plagurized [sic]-reading of phansty [sic] as 
Egypt inventing their past to make them (defendants) look good-at-its-core, as the Mayan 
writings of South America unreadable or undecipherable to the all seeing eye but to im-
press the Hellenized reader it so favors contrary to Constitutional law. 
Id.  I couldn’t have said it better myself. 
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District Judge John Nixon didn’t think so, and denied the petition.199  In 
United States v. Keiser,200 the defendant made a similar argument, “that 
law clerks frequently act as de facto judges, that judges inappropriately 
delegate non-delegable duties to the law clerks and that law clerks have 
usurped the duties of Article III judges.”201  Judge Ralph Erickson re-
sponded: 
While it is not customary for courts to discuss at great length how 
they utilize their law clerks, the Court notes without reservation that 
each of these complaints, if real, would constitute a serious abuse of 
the law clerk system and would be grounds for grave concern. 
Nothing leaves this Court’s chambers that is not the opinion of 
the judge.  Right or wrong, the work is the Court’s and law clerk in-
put is limited to research and writing under the direct supervision 
and control of the Judge.  Frankly, if there are errors in this Court’s 
work, they are the honest mistakes of the judge himself.  The parties 
may place blame wherever they wish, but the unvarnished truth is 
that from the most mundane spelling errors to erroneous holdings 
on critical rulings the errors are mine alone and I take full responsi-
bility for them.  The Court strives mightily to get all decisions it 
makes right, but if they are in error there should be no question as to 
who made the decision, because the undersigned makes all of the 
decisions that come out of this chambers.202 
                                                 
 199. Id. at 535. 
 200. No. 3:05-cr-80, 2006 WL 3751452 (D.N.D. Dec. 19, 2006). 
 201. Id. at *3. 
 202. Id. at *3–*4.  Judge Erickson was similarly unmoved by the defendant’s request that the 
court “keep time records for his personal uses.”  Id. at *4.  As he wrote: 
The Court knows of no legal authority for such an invasion of the Court’s independence.  
The deliberative processes of the Court will be set forth in its rulings as is the long tradi-
tion in our legal system.  The Defendant’s request is, frankly, insulting and strikes at the 
heart of the dignity of the [sic] our legal system.  Decisions in courts are not the product 
of a minimum number of hours of work—but the product of a deliberative process that is 
essentially dependent on the complexity of the issues raised. 
 In the case at bar, the Court has read every word of every document that the Defen-
dant has filed.  Much of what has been filed is not germane to the issues before the court, 
is confused and the product of an obviously non-law trained person, and overtly irrele-
vant—but it has all been closely read and considered.  When the Court rules on the vari-
ous motions pending before it the parties can be assured that it will do so based on the 
law of this Circuit and the facts as developed in the record.  The Court can further assure 
the parties that the Court will do all research and review necessary to make the best deci-
sions humanly possible; however, the Defendant should be aware that the lack of art in 
the pleadings in this case raise issues that would not ordinarily be present in a case of this 
sort.  It would be helpful to the Court if the Defendant would pay more attention to what 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has said on the various issues he 
intends to raise and less attention to general observations on the law made by Lord Mans-
field in 1768.  It would be a rare case indeed, that turned on a 250 year old observation by 
a Law Lord made in Privy Council.  Merely cobbling together centuries old axioms and 
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In Bear v. Potter,203 the plaintiff argued “that the use of staff attor-
neys and law clerks constitutes a fraud on the court.”204  In response, in 
an order that may or may not have been drafted by a law clerk, Judge 
Lacy Thornburg gave a brief history of law clerking205 and then stated: 
“The undersigned is unable to fathom how the 100-year old tradition of 
law clerks constitutes a fraud on the courts.”206 
In a critique that is somewhat more personal than institutional, the 
pro se plaintiff in Lineberry v. United States207 argued “that the Fifth Cir-
cuit has ‘hired low level law clerks, forcing them to deny all pro se peti-
tions.’”208  Judge David Folsom was not persuaded.209  Similarly unavail-
ing, albeit on procedural grounds, was the plaintiff’s claim, in Lowe v. 
United States,210 “that the United States has failed to properly train its 
judicial law clerks and that consequently, he has been denied his consti-
tutional rights through the actions of these clerks.”211  Inventive, but also 
unsuccessful, was the petitioner’s argument, in an appeal from the denial 
of a habeas corpus petition, “that the district court did not conduct a de 
                                                                                                             
asking the Court to take an action which appears to be completely without modern 
precedent is not ordinarily a prevailing strategy. 
Id. 
 203. 89 F. Supp. 2d 687 (W.D.N.C. 1999). 
 204. Id. at 691.  See also Lee v. Mullen, No. 3:99CV180, 1999 WL 907537 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 2, 
1999) (raising identical claim).  In the hands of creative litigants, “fraud on the court” is, if nothing 
else, a flexible theory.  In Johnson v. United States, 952 F.2d 406 (unpublished table decision), 1991 
WL 276390 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 1991), the plaintiff-appellant argued that the government committed 
fraud on the court, but his argument lost traction when, among other things, the court of appeals 
noted that the “ex parte” communication Johnson complained of was “nothing more than a memo-
randum to the district court judge from one of his own law clerks.”  Id. at *2. 
 And, in Cannon v. North Carolina, 110 F.3d 59 (unpublished table decision), 1997 WL 151769 
(4th Cir. Apr. 2, 1997), the court of appeals denied the appellant’s motion “for copies of law clerks’ 
memoranda to the court concerning this appeal and Appellant’s prior appeals.”  Id. at *1. 
 205. Bear, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 691. 
 206. Id.  Moreover, Judge Thornburg is far from alone in being unable to fathom such claims.  
See, e.g., Kashelkar v. Bluestone, No. 06 Civ. 08323(LTS)(THK), 2007 WL 2791432, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2007) (dismissing as “patently frivolous” plaintiff’s claim that “the ‘decisions’ 
[dismissing his cases] were not even made by the Judges but have been made by their Law Clerks 
and deputies’ . . . .  That is nothing but absolute frauds”); Stewart v. Thomas, No. 3:02CV57-WLO, 
2002 WL 32144764, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2002) (dismissing as frivolous “complaint alleging 
various requests for relief, including a request that ghostwriting of judicial opinions be declared 
unconstitutional, the prevention of law clerk participation in assisting the judge, and requiring that 
the assigned judge punch in and out on the clock establishing a record of time spent on Plaintiff’s 
motion”). 
 207. No. 5:08cv72, 2009 WL 499763 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2009). 
 208. Id. at *3. 
 209. Id. 
 210. No. 2:08cv466-MEF, 2008 WL 2705124 (M.D. Ala. July 9, 2008). 
 211. Id. at *1. 
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novo review of the magistrate judge’s decision . . . because the same law 
clerk assisted the judges in making their decisions.”212 
B.  Shopping for Law Clerks 
Most savvy litigators have, at one time or another, considered the 
venerable practice of forum shopping.  And more than a few have at-
tempted the finer-grained variant of forum shopping, judge shopping.213  
Some enterprising attorneys have even gone one step further by trying to 
shop for law clerks. 
In Day v. Apoliona,214 five native Hawaiians filed suit to challenge 
“the manner in which the office of Hawaiian Affairs (‘OHA’) has been 
and is spending money.”215  They objected to having a Hawaiian law 
clerk work on their case: 
At the hearing on this matter, Plaintiffs asked whether a Ha-
waiian or native Hawaiian law clerk was working on this case.  
Plaintiffs had noticed that the case docket referred to “kmk.”  By 
going from the docket sheet to the Notice of Electronic Filing, one 
could see that “kmk” referred to Kanoelani M. Kane.  Plaintiffs in-
quired whether that was a reference to a Hawaiian law clerk.  The 
court explained that Ms. Kane is a law clerk working on this case 
and is Hawaiian, and that Ms. Kane’s father is native Hawaiian.  
The court also explained that neither the law clerk nor her father is 
currently seeking funds or other benefits from OHA, and neither has 
a present intent to seek benefits from OHA in the future.  The court 
noted that the court reporter reporting on the case is also Hawaiian 
and that the courtroom manager is married to a native Hawaiian and 
has Hawaiian children.  The court opined that barring Hawaiians 
and native Hawaiians from working on the case would eliminate a 
large number of people employed by the court.  It would also elimi-
nate one senior district judge.  Plaintiffs said they were objecting 
only to the Hawaiian law clerk, alleging that the law clerk has a per-
sonal interest in the outcome of this case.216 
Judge Susan Mollway rejected the plaintiffs’ argument: “Because the law 
clerk and her family have no current interest in the outcome of this case, 
                                                 
 212. Sattiewhite v. Scott, 53 F.3d 1281 (unpublished table decision), 1995 WL 295892, at *2 
(5th Cir. Apr. 20, 1995). 
 213. However, as many judge shoppers have learned, to their regret, conflicts do not roll uphill.  
Rather, “when a judge’s law clerk has a possible conflict of interest . . ., it is the clerk, not the judge, 
who must be disqualified.”  Lawal v. RTM, 260 F. App’x 149, 152 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Parker 
v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1525 (11th Cir. 1988)). 
 214. 451 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Haw. 2006). 
 215. Id. at 1134. 
 216. Id. at 1137. 
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Plaintiffs’ objection arises solely because the law clerk is Hawaiian.  Re-
cusal based solely on race is unwarranted and improper.”217 
The plaintiff in Shiplet v. Veneman218 was equally unsuccessful in a 
rather audacious attempt at law-clerk shopping: 
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Counsel, Terry Schaplow, contacted 
this Court’s Law-Clerk, and requested that she, rather than her male 
colleague, work on this case.  The Court cautions Counsel that such 
a request is highly unusual and patently inappropriate.  The Court is 
fully capable of assigning cases before it to law clerks.  In addition, 
the Court finds it particularly inappropriate that Counsel would 
make such a request in the context of a gender discrimination case.  
Counsel is encouraged to make no such requests in the future.219 
I’m torn between “Wow” and “Yikes.”  On second thought, perhaps At-
torney Schaplow has earned one of each. 
And then there is Jerry Read, law clerk to Judge Lyonel Senter of 
the Southern District of Mississippi.  In two different cases arising out of 
disputes concerning insurance coverage for damage from Hurricane Ka-
trina,220 State Farm Fire and Casualty Company moved to disqualify 
Read, on grounds that “Read’s having filed suit against his property in-
surer, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), for property damage, he, 
Read, sustained in Hurricane Katrina reasonably [brought] into question 
his, Read’s, ability to discharge his duties as law clerk in the context of 
Katrina litigation.”221  After determining that his law clerk had no insur-
ance coverage with State Farm, Judge Senter rejected State Farm’s ar-
gument, twice.222 
                                                 
 217. Id. at 1138 (citing MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Grp. Equip. Fin., Inc., 138 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 
1998) (“A suggestion that a judge cannot administer the law fairly because of the judge’s racial and 
ethnic heritage is extremely serious and should not be made without a factual foundation going well 
beyond the judge’s membership in a particular racial or ethnic group.”)). 
 218. 620 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (D. Mont. 2009). 
 219. Id. at 1205 n.1.  Law-clerk gender played a slightly different role in Duffy v. Wolle, 123 
F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 1997).  In that case, David Duffy sued a panel of United States District Judges 
who selected a female applicant, rather than him, to serve as Chief United States Probation Officer.  
Id. at 1029.  In ruling that Duffy had “made a prima facie case of employment discrimination,” id. at 
1037, the court of appeals noted, among other things, “that two members of the Panel had usually 
hired female law clerks,” id.  While the court of appeals held that evidence to be sufficient to support 
Duffy’s prima facie case, it went on to rule that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling 
that the Panel’s law-clerk hiring practices were irrelevant as evidence that the Panel’s stated reasons 
for not hiring him were pretextual.  Id. at 1039. 
 220. Eleuterius v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV647 LTS-RHW, 2007 WL 1745292 
(S.D. Miss. June 13, 2007); Guice v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CIVA106CV001 LTSRHW, 
2007 WL 601208 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 23, 2007). 
 221. Guice, 2007 WL 601208, at *1. 
 222. See Eleuterius, 2007 WL 1745292, at *2; Guice, 2007 WL 601208, at *1. 
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C.  Accusations of Misconduct 
In this section, I canvass cases in which law clerks have been ac-
cused of doing things they should not have done, only to be exonerated, 
either by their own judges or by their judges’ appellate overseers.  In 
other words, I focus on things law clerks can do without worrying about 
getting their judges in trouble or compromising the cases on which they 
are working.  Moreover, this section is about actual verified law-clerk 
conduct, rather than unfounded accusations of law-clerk misconduct 
which, while often colorful,223 have relatively little educational value.  In 
trying to gain an advantage by picking on law clerks, attorneys have fo-
cused on a variety of conduct, including but hardly limited to the perfor-
mance of activities typically conducted by judges, law-clerk research, 
contact with attorneys and parties, contact with jurors, and conduct in 
court. 
1. Acting as a Judge 
In light of decisions such as Riley v. Deeds,224 it is not surprising 
that parties have sought relief based upon claims that law clerks have 
exercised powers above their pay grade.  Such a claim went nowhere in 
United States v. Long.225  In that case, a criminal defendant argued that 
“the district court’s law clerk announced the jury’s impasse when neither 
[he] nor the trial judge were present, which improperly convened the 
court and created a structural defect requiring all of the forfeiture ver-
dicts to be vacated.”226  The court of appeals disagreed: 
The record before us does not show that the law clerk actually 
“convened” court in Judge Wanger’s absence.  Judge Wanger in-
formed the parties that he had to leave the court-house but had ar-
ranged for Judge Coyle to preside over the jury’s deliberations.  The 
defense timely objected.  Outside the presence of the jury, the law 
clerk informed the parties that Judge Coyle was still home due to a 
misunderstanding.  The jury had a question for the court, and the 
                                                 
 223. See, e.g., In re Sokol, 108 F.3d 1370 (unpublished table decision), 1997 WL 138440, at *1 
(2d Cir. Mar. 21, 1997) (“Sokol has failed to present any credible evidence to support his theory, 
under Rule 60(b)(3), that the district court’s law clerk worked in collusion with the State’s attor-
ney.”); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1410–11 (5th Cir. 1994) (“They 
alleged, inter alia, that Judge Mentz’s law clerk and Travelers’ counsel made ‘false statement[s] of 
material fact to the court’, intentionally misled the court in violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, and otherwise committed ‘ill practices’.  In light of the unrestrained accusations and innu-
endos we have seen in these actions, these charges simply reinforce the perception of the reckless 
attacks in which the Liljebergs and their counsel have engaged.”). 
 224. 56 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 225. 301 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 226. Id. at 1107. 
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law clerk asked defense counsel if she wanted Judge Wanger or 
Judge Coyle to come in.  Defense counsel stated that she did not 
want a mistrial, and asked for Judge Coyle to come in and give an 
Allen charge. . . . 
The law clerk then read the jury’s question into the record.  The 
law clerk then discussed which version of the Allen charge the par-
ties wanted.  Judge Coyle then arrived. 
Unlike the cases Long cites, the law clerk in this case did not 
actually “convene” court as to create reversible constitutional error.  
Instead, the law clerk merely facilitated communication between the 
parties until Judge Coyle arrived.  Furthermore, it is clear from the 
transcript that the law clerk’s conversation with the lawyers was all 
outside the presence of the jury.227 
So, while a law clerk ought not convene court, the long and the short of it 
is that doing what the Long clerk did fell short of causing a problem. 
2. Researching off the Reservation 
While the intrepid investigative law clerk in Kennedy v. Great At-
lantic & Pacific Tea Co.228 put himself in a bit of a pickle by playing 
Law Clerk PI, several other law-clerk investigators have gotten away 
unscathed, if only barely. 
Perhaps the most famous is the unnamed law clerk in Price Broth-
ers Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp.229  In that case: 
Philadelphia Gear alleged that prior to the trial the trial judge’s law 
clerk had traveled from Dayton, Ohio, to Beacon, New York, and 
had observed the operation of the pipe wrapping machine that is at 
the center of this controversy.  Philadelphia Gear argued that the 
law clerk’s observations were presumably reported to the trial 
judge, and speculated that this report may have been relied on by 
the judge in making his findings. . . .  Philadelphia Gear argues that 
the fact finding potentially based on the nonevidentiary observation 
by the law clerk is clearly erroneous as a matter of law.230 
On the case’s first trip up the appellate ladder, occasioned by Judge Carl 
Rubin’s decision not to amend the judgment to reflect his law clerk’s 
visit to New York,231 the court of appeals expressed its belief “that, 
where a suit is to be tried without a jury, sending a law clerk to gather 
                                                 
 227. Id. at 1107–08. 
 228. 551 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 229. 649 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 230. Id. at 419. 
 231. See Price Bros. Co. v. Phila. Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1980). 
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evidence is so destructive of the appearance of impartiality required of a 
presiding judge that we must remand this case for an evidentiary hearing 
to determine the truth of Philadelphia Gear’s allegation.”232  On remand, 
a different district judge held a hearing,233 and the case found its way 
back to the court of appeals.  In its second Price Brothers opinion, the 
court explained: 
It is imperative that a finder of fact avoid off-the-record con-
tacts that might bias its judgment or otherwise impair its ability to 
fairly and objectively weigh the evidence properly submitted at tri-
al.  A judge presiding at a bench trial may not directly or indirectly, 
through his law clerk or by any other means, conduct an investiga-
tion outside the record and use the results of that investigation in de-
termining the facts of a case.  It need hardly be mentioned that what 
a judge cannot do in person he may not do by proxy.  The fact that 
the clerk rather than the judge made the trip and observed the ma-
chine in no way alters the problem.234 
After describing the circumstances of the law clerk’s view of the ma-
chine, the court of appeals determined that the law clerk’s view “created 
a presumption of prejudice to the defendant in the trial judge’s determi-
nation of facts that [had to] be rebutted before his decision [could] 
stand.”235  Then, the court of appeals declared the presumption to be re-
butted: 
Based on the undisputed testimony produced at the hearing on 
remand, we conclude that the presumption of prejudice arising from 
the law clerk’s report of off-the-record observations has been over-
come.  The law clerk’s testimony and the statement of the trial 
judge establish that the sole purpose of the clerk’s trip was to ob-
serve the operation of the pipe wrapping machine and describe it to 
the judge so that he might be better able to understand the evidence 
to be produced at trial.  There is no indication that the trial judge 
considered the law clerk’s report as evidence or that the judge was 
improperly influenced in his fact finding by the clerk’s report.  
Since the trial judge’s fact finding was not based on the off-the-
record contact of the clerk’s view, any error that may have occurred 
in not obtaining the parties’ consent to that view did not result in 
prejudice and was harmless.  We therefore conclude that the specter 
of prejudice created by the judge’s off-the-record contact with ma-
                                                 
 232. Id. at 446. 
 233. Price Bros. Co. v. Phila. Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 234. Id. at 419. 
 235. Id. at 420. 
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terial evidence has been removed, and that the trial judge’s findings 
were not biased by his law clerk’s view of the wrapping machine.236 
While the court of appeals appears to have drafted up a pretty nice get-
out-of-jail-free card for judges and law clerks inclined to conduct their 
own discovery, the whole enterprise still seems fraught with peril. 
Price Brothers involved rather traditional sleuthing techniques; the 
electronic age has created a whole new realm of law-clerk research.  At 
least one litigant has objected.  In Lisson v. O’Hare,237 the unsuccessful 
plaintiff in an action for copyright and trademark infringement argued 
“that the magistrate judge was required to recuse himself after his law 
clerk viewed publicly accessible portions of [his] web-
site, InsiderCV.com, which was the subject of [his] infringement and 
fraud claims.”238  While acknowledging its own previous decision in 
Kennedy, the court of appeals disagreed: 
Lisson cites no case in which this court has made it plain that a 
judge must recuse himself simply because he or his law clerk has 
viewed a website that is the subject of default proceedings to prove 
damages.  Although one case cited by Lisson, Kennedy v. Great At-
lantic & Pacific Tea Co., 551 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1977), bears 
some superficial similarities to the facts in his case, it also presents 
significant differences.  In Kennedy, a law clerk took a private view 
of evidence for purposes related to determining fault and then, on 
instruction of the district judge, communicated to defense counsel 
what he had seen, eventually resulting in (a) the district court’s hav-
ing to advise plaintiff of the viewing and of the ex-parte communi-
cation and (b) plaintiff’s calling the clerk to testify.  See Kennedy, 
551 F.2d at 597.  We held that “the potential for prejudice to the de-
fendants’ case was too great . . . to conclude that the . . . overruling 
of the defendants’ motion to prohibit” the clerk from testifying be-
fore the jury “or, in the alternative, to disqualify [the district judge] 
from continuing in the trial was harmless error.”  Id. at 598–99.  
Here, however, there was no chance of prejudicing a jury, and Lis-
son adduced no admission or other proof that the law clerk ever re-
lated anything about the website to the magistrate judge other than 
the fact of his visit.  Moreover, “[m]ere prior knowledge of some 
facts” germane to a suit “is not in itself necessarily sufficient to re-
                                                 
 236. Id. at 420–21; see also Harris v. Jam. Auto Repair, Inc., No. 03-CV-417(EBK), 2009 WL 
2242355, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2009) (rejecting defendant’s argument that certain records ob-
tained by subpoena “should be excluded as ‘the fruit of improper and unauthorized discovery’ con-
ducted by Court’s law clerk”). 
 237. 326 F. App’x 259 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 238. Id. at 260. 
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quire disqualification.”  United States v. Seiffert, 501 F.2d 974, 978 
(5th Cir. 1974).239 
The plaintiff in Lisson appears to be the exception; as often as not, it 
seems that litigants are disinclined to kick up a fuss when law clerks let 
their fingers do the walking.240 
Another kind of law-clerk information gathering has, however, up-
set several litigants or their attorneys.  In In re Charges of Judicial Mis-
conduct,241 attorneys in the Connecticut Division of Criminal Justice and 
the Office of the Chief State’s Attorney filed a judicial misconduct com-
plaint against Chief Judge Robert Chatigny of the District of Connecticut 
based upon things he did in two actions challenging the execution of Mi-
chael Ross, who had been convicted in the state courts of Connecticut.242  
Specifically, the complainants asserted that Judge Chatigny “abandoned 
the role of neutral and detached magistrate and instead became an advo-
cate for the position held by the parties who were seeking to stop the ex-
ecution”243 by, among other things, having his law clerk attend three days 
of hearings in the state court on the issues of competency and volitional 
capacity, “due to the possibility that the issues being decided might re-
turn” to his court.244  The Judicial Council of the Second Circuit adopted 
a report by a Special Committee that recommended dismissing all the 
charges against Judge Chatigny, including the one based in part on send-
                                                 
 239. Id. at 260–61.  The trial court was similarly unpersuaded by Lisson’s argument: 
Plaintiff is requesting damages based on Defendant’s alleged copying and “invasion” of 
his website, yet at the same time he is complaining that the Court’s law clerk actually vi-
sited the website.  The Court must wonder aloud how, exactly, Plaintiff thought the Court 
was going to determine if he was legally entitled to damages for improper use of his web-
site without at least receiving some sort of evidence about what it is and the information 
it contains, and thus why Plaintiff is concerned by the Court’s law clerk having visited 
the site. 
Lisson v. O’Hare, Civ. No. A-05-CA-114-LY, 2007 WL 1742188, at *1 (W.D. Tex. June 14, 2007). 
 240. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Potter, Civ. No. 05-5191, 2006 WL 2715042, at *1 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 
22, 2006) (“Being skeptical of plaintiff’s assertions that she was unable to learn the postmaster’s 
mailing address by visiting the U.S. Postal Service’s website, the Court directed its Law Clerk to 
make a similar attempt.”); Alexander v. Klem, No. CIV.A. 04-2174, 2004 WL 2601079, at *1 (E.D. 
Pa. Nov. 16, 2004) (“This Court’s law clerk has performed an independent electronic search of the 
Appellate Court Web Docket Sheets available to the public at the website of the Administrative 
Office of Pennsylvania Courts.”); Robert Diaz Assocs. Enters. v. Eleste, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 
7758(DFE), 2004 WL 1087468, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2004) (“On March 25 and April 8, 2004, 
my law clerk accessed Elete’s website.”); Malletier v. WhenU.Com, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 1325 (LAK), 
2007 WL 257717, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2007) (“My law clerk’s internet research shows that 
Lushbag.com’s website no longer exists.”) 
 241. 465 F.3d 532 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 242. Id. at 534. 
 243. Id. at 536. 
 244. Id. at 550. 
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ing his law clerk to observe state-court hearings.245  In response to a simi-
lar challenge, Judge Raymond Broderick declined to recuse himself from 
United States v. Romano,246 notwithstanding the defendant’s argument 
“that the presence of one of the court’s law clerks at the oral argument on 
[her] appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals indicate[d] a ‘personal, 
extrajudicial interest’ in her case.”247  As Judge Broderick wrote: 
The presence of one of a court’s law clerks at an appellate argument 
is evidence only of the law clerk’s interest in the appellate review of 
the case.  Indeed, the very arguments made by and before the appel-
late tribunal will presumably be reflected in the decision ultimately 
rendered by that tribunal and transmitted to the trial court.  As pre-
viously stated, for a motion to recuse to be granted, defendant must 
allege bias or prejudice from sources other than the judicial pro-
ceedings in the case and must show that the bias is personal as op-
posed to judicial.  See United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 485 
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975).  We conclude that 
a law clerk’s attendance at arguments before the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals of a case is not a basis for disqualification of the trial 
judge.248 
Based on Charges of Judicial Misconduct and Romano, it would seem 
that judges have free rein to send their law clerks out to watch other 
judges in action. 
3. Contacting Attorneys 
It is well understood that judges, and by extension law clerks, must 
be circumspect in their dealings with attorneys, and that ex parte contact 
with attorneys is to be avoided.  Thus, it should be no surprise that from 
time to time, parties in litigation have attempted to gain advantage by 
charging law clerks with having inappropriate contact with the attorneys 
on the other side.249  And, in at least one case, a party complained about 
                                                 
 245. Id. at 533. 
 246. CRIM. No. 87-00030, 1988 WL 117844 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 1988). 
 247. Id. at *4. 
 248. Id. (parallel citation omitted); see also SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1156 
n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting appellant’s contention that District Judge John Pratt erred by having 
his law clerk telephone the United States District Court in Dallas to inquire about docket congestion 
in that court). 
 249. Happily, however, at least for those obligated to defend against a claim that their counsel 
had inappropriate contact with a law clerk, proof of a single ex parte communication between an 
attorney and law clerk does not raise a reasonable inference that there were more such communica-
tions.  See Kaufman v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 601 F.3d 1088, 1095–96 (10th Cir. 2010). 
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contact between a law clerk and her own attorney.250  This section de-
scribes cases in which such claims have failed, sometimes spectacularly. 
In LaChapelle v. City of El Cajon,251 the court of appeals held that 
“[t]he discussion between appellee’s counsel and Judge Jones’s law clerk 
regarding scheduling the summary judgment motion was not an improper 
ex parte communication, and did not violate LaChapelle’s due process 
rights.”252  In another case involving face-to-face contact with a law 
clerk, the plaintiff in Trammel v. First Bank of Searcy253 “moved to re-
cuse the judge based on the ‘appearance of impropriety’”254 after he 
learned that one “Mr. Davis [president of the defendant bank] and one of 
the district judge’s law clerks, who had begun work two days earlier, 
were friends and attended the same weekly Bible study class.”255  The 
district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals ruled that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by doing so, noting that “Mr. 
Trammel acknowledged . . . that the judge never had a professional or 
personal relationship with Mr. Davis, and the court assured the parties 
                                                 
 250. In response to a litigant’s claim that she and her counsel had been mistreated by the court, 
through its law clerk, Judge David Arceneaux had this to say: 
The undersigned judge must first note that his law clerks simply are not permitted to 
speak to parties.  Neither this judge nor his law clerk, therefore, have had any contact 
with Ms. Livaccari and, furthermore, have not “mistreated” her in any manner whatsoev-
er. 
 As a courtesy to the bar, the undersigned judge does permit his law clerks to speak 
with counsel.  Plaintiff’s counsel, however, abused this courtesy and, in this instance, the 
law clerk acted appropriately in instructing Mr. Roy Raspanti that further communica-
tions with the court should be in the form of formal motions.  Prior to the incident com-
plained of in Plaintiff’s memorandum relative to the undersigned’s law clerk, Mr. Ras-
panti had called chambers a number of times seeking information on procedural matters 
and, at one point, even asking the court’s intentions with respect to the motion to remand 
pending before it. 
 This judge stood nearby the day his law clerk told Mr. Raspanti not to telephone 
chambers in the future.  Under the circumstances, the restraint shown toward Mr. Raspan-
ti by this judge’s law clerk should be commended.  Furthermore, in the court’s view, the 
requirement that this Plaintiff’s counsel only communicate with the court through written 
motion has alleviated any further misunderstandings or incidents complained of here. 
 Plaintiff, therefore, again fails to persuade the court.  Disqualification is not war-
ranted because Plaintiff’s counsel does not appreciate the manner in which a law clerk 
spoke to him or the fact that he must seek relief through formal motion practice. 
Livaccari v. Zack’s Famous Frozen Yogurt, Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-1936, 1992 WL 236950, at *3–*4 
(E.D. La. Aug. 31, 1992). 
 251. 142 F.3d 444 (unpublished table decision), 1998 WL 196678 (9th Cir. Apr. 22, 1998). 
 252. Id. at *1 (citing Alexander Shokai, Inc. v. Comm’r, 34 F.3d 1480, 1484–85 (9th Cir. 
1994)). 
 253. 345 F.3d 611 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 254. Id. at 612. 
 255. Id. 
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that the law clerk had not and would not have ‘any involvement what-
soever’ with the court’s handling of the case.”256 
On several occasions, telephone calls have served as the basis for 
unsuccessful litigant complaints about ex parte contact with law clerks.  
In Walsh v. WOR Radio,257 the trial court ruled that when its “law clerk 
called defendant’s counsel to confirm that the correct document had been 
received,”258 the call was simply a procedural inquiry “to ascertain that 
the public record . . . in the Court’s official file was complete,”259 and 
thus, was not an improper ex parte communication.  Similarly, under the 
heading “Arguments Without Merit,” Judge Kimba Wood rejected the 
plaintiff’s claim that the court had an improper ex parte communication 
with counsel for the defendant when the trial judge’s law clerk tele-
phoned the defendant’s counsel to confirm that the defendant did not ob-
ject to including in the record a document that the plaintiff had requested 
be included and that the defendant had, in fact, provided.260 
I conclude with a case in which a charge of inappropriate contact 
not only failed, but also boomeranged back on the attorneys who made it.  
In Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,261 Judge Jerry Smith wrote: 
Plaintiffs’ attorney, Julius J. Larry, III, contends that Phillips’s 
outside attorney, Kerry E. Notestine, engaged in improper ex parte 
communications with the district judge, the magistrate judge, and 
their law clerks.  The record is singularly devoid of evidence that 
the contacts were improper.  Moreover, these same accusations 
were briefed and rejected in the district court.  Lacking any evi-
dence that the contacts were improper, the accusations of plaintiffs’ 
counsel are scurrilous, frivolous, and contrary to the duties of an of-
ficer of the court.  Larry’s legal arguments are also frivolous and in-
dependently deserving of sanctions.262 
                                                 
 256. Id. at 613. 
 257. 537 F. Supp. 2d 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 258. Id. at 556. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Maharam v. Patterson, No. 04 CV 9569(KMW), 2008 WL 1886062, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
28, 2008); see also AIB Baker Shopping Ctr. Props, LLC v. Deptford Twp. Planning Bd., No. Civ.A. 
04-5849FLW, 2006 WL 83107, at *12 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 2006) (terming ex parte communications 
“anathema in our system of justice” and then rejecting party’s claim that a law clerk engaged in ex 
parte communication by receiving telephone call to chambers on procedural matter from counsel for 
the other side) (quoting In re Kensington Int’l Ltd. 368 F.3d 289, 309 (3d Cir. 2004)); United States 
v. Wecht, Crim. No. 06-0026, 2008 WL 2048350, at *18–*19 (W.D. Pa. May 8, 2008) (denying 
defendant’s motion for recusal which was based, in part, on the judge’s law clerk’s having opened a 
letter addressed to the defendant (and sent “care of” the courthouse), pursuant to courthouse safety 
procedures implemented in response to the events of September 11, 2001). 
 261. 23 F.3d 930 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 262. Id. at 938. 
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One example of Attorney Larry’s tactics should suffice to demonstrate 
the basis for the court’s obvious ire: 
Reviewing each of the allegedly improper contacts, Larry’s 
duplicity in imputing unethical conduct to Notestine becomes ap-
parent.  For instance, in his brief on appeal, Larry reproduces the 
first contact as follows: 
4/14/93 1.80 (Hours) Telephone conference with clerk to Judge 
Harmon. 
 
The record indicates that this excerpt should read: 
4/14/93 1.80 (Hours) Telephone conference with clerk to Judge 
Harmon re: status; telephone conference 
with Rob Fries re: same; preparation of 
discovery response to sent to other side; 
review of reply to defendants response to 
plaintiff’s motion for leave to supplement 
their complaint; transmitting same to client. 
 
Comparing Larry’s excerpt with the accurate report, Larry 
plainly intended to mislead this court into believing that Notestine 
spoke with [sic] for almost two hours with Judge Harmon’s law 
clerk.  The context of the full billing report, however, indicates that 
the phone conversation occupied only a small portion of the time.  
Moreover, because this entire issue was already briefed in the dis-
trict court, Larry knew that Notestine’s communication was actually 
with Judge Harmon’s case manager, not any law clerk.  Larry ad-
mits that contacts with a case manager are permissible.  Despite re-
cognizing that the time sheet should read “case manager” rather 
than “law clerk,” he doggedly and irrelevantly continues to argue 
that law clerks should not communicate with parties.263 
The court went on to describe four more examples of Attorney Larry’s 
misleadingly sliced-and-diced billing records, accused him of “at-
tempt[ing] to mislead the court by blatantly misrepresenting the 
record,”264 and concluded that “[h]is only discernable motive is to cast 
brickbats and to ‘poison the well’ by tattling on his opponent.”265  For 
Attorney Larry’s “baseless allegations and his attempt to lie to [the] court 
                                                 
 263. Id. at 938–39. 
 264. Id. at 940. 
 265. Id. 
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regarding what is in the record,”266 the court of appeals deemed the ap-
peal frivolous,267 and sanctioned Attorney Larry, and his client, to the 
tune of  “$20,000.00 and attorneys’ costs of $3,039.22, plus double taxa-
ble costs on appeal.”268 
4. Contacting Jurors 
Just as they should avoid inappropriate contact with attorneys in the 
cases they are working on, so too, should law clerks avoid improper con-
tacts with jurors.  In this section, I describe several cases in which 
charges of improper juror contact have been raised only to be rejected on 
grounds that the contact that took place was not improper. 
In United States v. Finze,269 the Ninth Circuit ruled that “[n]either 
plain nor structural error occurred when the district judge, whose throat 
was affected by illness, had his law clerk, with Finze’s consent, read 
aloud the jury instructions.”270  In the court’s view, “[t]he clerk was 
simply a ministerial mouthpiece, exercising no Article III power over a 
critical stage of the trial.”271 
Similarly ineffective was the defendant’s claim, in United States v. 
Brilliant,272 a habeas corpus petition under 42 U.S.C. § 2255, that “there 
was an unauthorized communication with the jury during its delibera-
tions by the Court’s law clerk.”273  In Brilliant, Judge Leo Rayfiel ruled 
that there was nothing amiss when the trial judge’s law clerk, during the 
judge’s absence from chambers, “replied to [a] jury[ ] question, [in a note 
signed by counsel for both sides] with the consent of counsel for both 
sides.”274  In United States v. Balderas,275 the court of appeals held that 
the district court judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the defen-
dant’s motion for a new trial when a juror, concerned about information 
she learned about a fellow juror during deliberations, notified the jury 
commissioner, who brought the juror to the trial judge’s law clerk, who 
informed the judge of the juror’s concerns.276  And, in Reazin v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc.,277 the court of appeals ruled that 
Judge Patrick Kelly did not err by having his law clerk ask the jury about 
                                                 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 941. 
 269. 234 F. App’x 803 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 270. Id. at 805. 
 271. Id. (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876 (1989)). 
 272. 172 F. Supp. 712, 713 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. 27 F.3d 567 (unpublished table decision), 1994 WL 144449 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 1994). 
 276. Id. at *1. 
 277. 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990). 
2010] Law Clerks Gone Wild 223 
its progress toward reaching a verdict and did so with “the prior know-
ledge and approval, or at least acquiescence, of counsel.”278 
Another common area of concern is contact between law clerks and 
jurors in the context of evidence.279  In United States v. Yago,280 the court 
of appeals rejected the defendant’s contention that the trial court “created 
the impermissible appearance of endorsing the credibility” of a witness 
by telling the jury that the person reading the translation of a transcript of 
the witness’s tape-recorded statement was a law clerk.281  And, in United 
States v. Holton,282 the court of appeals declined to presume harm when a 
law clerk replayed audiotapes to the jury in the courtroom, during the 
course of its deliberations.283 
Finally, in United States v. Velasquez-Carbona,284 the court of ap-
peals ruled that it was not plain error for the trial court to deny the defen-
dant “an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his due process rights 
were violated when the trial judge’s law clerk gave one of the jurors a 
ride to a bus stop”285 on the final day of trial, when the closing arguments 
ran late.286  As Judge Andrew Kleinfeld wrote: “We do not presume pre-
judice where a court or its staff show courtesy to citizens serving as ju-
rors.  The district court’s failure to order an evidentiary hearing on this 
ground, when none was requested by Velasquez, did not constitute a 
miscarriage of justice or an affront to the integrity and reputation of the 
judicial process.”287 
5. Acting Out in Court 
Parties have also been known to complain, generally without suc-
cess, about the conduct of law clerks in the courtroom, during trial. 
                                                 
 278. Id. at  978–79 (quoting Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 
1360, 1442 (D. Kan. 1987)). 
 279. In Thompson v. Greene, an appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
under 42 U.S.C. § 2254, the petitioner complained of the trial court’s “permitting the jury to review 
evidentiary videotapes during its deliberations in the presence of the court’s law clerk.”  427 F.3d 
263, 265 (4th Cir. 2005).  The court of appeals never reached that issue, however, because the trial 
court had determined that it had been procedurally defaulted.  Id. at 266 n.3. 
 280. 122 F.3d 1076 (unpublished table decision), 1997 WL 547960 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 1997). 
 281. Id. at *3. 
 282. 116 F.3d 1536 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 283. Id. at 1545.  In reaching that decision, the court noted that both parties were informed 
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suggesting that the law clerk either made independent decisions about whether or how to replay 
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 284. 991 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 285. Id. at 576. 
 286. Id. at 575. 
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In United States v. Alexander,288 the defendant moved for a new tri-
al on three grounds, including his allegation that “the jury may have been 
prejudiced . . . by remarks made among [the trial judge’s] law clerks and 
[the trial judge] while sitting near the jury box during the presentation of 
the defendant’s expert witness.”289  After denying relief on that theory on 
grounds that the defendant had waived it, by failing to object at trial,290 
Judge Morey Sear continued: 
Even were the objection not waived, where defense counsel’s affi-
davit does not even directly assert that anything was said within the 
hearing of the jury, and I am confident that the jury could not possi-
bly have overheard anything that may have been whispered among 
my law clerks and myself, it would seem that the objection would 
be overruled without even holding a hearing.291 
In United States v. Conners,292 the defendant did object, at trial, to 
“the facial expressions of one of the court’s [law] clerks during [his] 
presentation of his case.”293  Then: 
In response to Conners’ charge that one of the court’s clerks made 
inappropriate facial gestures in the presence of the jury, the court 
again offered to poll the jury.  When Conners rejected this offer, the 
court interrogated both the juror who had complained of the clerk’s 
expressions and the clerk himself.  The court found that no “evi-
                                                 
 288. Crim. No. 85-243, 1988 WL 6333 (E.D. La. Jan. 22, 1988). 
 289. Id. at *2. 
 290. Id. at *8. 
 291. Id. at *8 n.17 (citing United States v. Sedigh, 658 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1981); United States 
v. Carter, 433 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1970)).  A similar claim met a similar fate in Gibson v. Total 
Car Care Franchising Corp., 223 F.R.D. 265 (M.D.N.C. 2004).  In a motion for post-judgment 
relief, the defendant argued that it was prejudiced by the conduct of the court’s law clerk during the 
testimony of one of its witnesses.  Id. at 278.  Specifically, the defendant “assert[ed] that the Court’s 
law clerk shook her head and rolled her eyes during portions of Mr. Evans’ testimony.”  Id. at 278 
n.9.  Judge Carlton Tilley rejected that claim on grounds of the defense counsel’s failure to “make a 
contemporaneous objection nor motion for mistrial based on the law clerk’s asserted actions even 
though he claimed to have seen it more than once during Evans’ testimony.”  Id. at 278.  Then, 
Judge Tilley addressed the merits anyway: 
 Even if the issue had been properly preserved, there would be no grounds for ac-
tion.  The physical dimensions and configuration of the courtroom make it unlikely that a 
member of the jury would have been able to see the law clerk or her reactions to testimo-
ny.  The law clerk was not within the field of view of someone sitting in the jury box and 
looking towards the witness stand.  Additionally, from the jury’s perspective, the law 
clerk was positioned behind a person taller than herself, the courtroom deputy clerk.  
There is no reason to believe that, even if the incident occurred, it would have had any ef-
fect on the jury. 
Id. 
 292. 894 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 293. Id. at 992.  In Krankowski v. O’Neil, No. 08-CV-1595, 2010 WL 1329033, at *1 (M.D. 
Pa. Mar. 26, 2010), the plaintiff mentioned, but did not actually litigate, a law-clerk smirk. 
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dence or suggestion of a comment from the Court” had been made.  
The court then immediately cautioned the jury that the actions of the 
court staff should not be interpreted as commentary, and further in-
structed the jury that “no act or gesture by the Court or its staff is 
designed to suggest or convey in any way or manner any intimation 
of what verdict I think you ought to find.”  The court’s findings and 
curative instructions demonstrate that it did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to grant Conners further relief on his complaint about the 
facial expressions of the clerk.294 
Sadly, the opinion in Conners sheds no light on how or why a juror came 
to complain about a law clerk’s facial expressions, not to mention “the 
clerk himself.”  The case does, however, remind us that a trial-court law 
clerk is well advised to wear a poker face to court. 
6. Other Bad Stuff 
Falling outside the categories enumerated above are two more un-
successful claims of law-clerk misconduct.  In Estes-El v. Long Island 
Jewish Medical Center,295 the plaintiff accused the trial judge’s law clerk 
of practicing law, a claim which Magistrate Judge Andrew Peck soundly 
rejected: 
By letter dated August 29, 1995 to plaintiff, Corporation Counsel 
stated that in response to his letter to the Court requesting a pre-
motion conference, “Judge Kaplan’s law clerk informed me that I 
should make a motion seeking the stay.”  Plaintiff Estes-El ex-
presses outrage that “The Judge’s law secretary is practicing law for 
the City of New York by advising the City Corporation Counsel 
what motions to file” and alleges that this violates plaintiff’s rights.  
Plaintiff Estes-El misunderstands the Court’s procedures.  Many 
judges of this Court require a party to seek a pre-motion conference 
before the party can file a motion.  When defense counsel here 
sought such a pre-motion conference, Judge Kaplan’s chambers in-
structed him that defendants could file their proposed motion with-
out the need for a pre-motion conference.  The judge’s chambers 
was not in any way practicing law for or advising defendants’ coun-
sel.296 
                                                 
 294. Conners, 894 F.2d at 993 (citations to the record omitted).  Conners’s habeas corpus 
petition, under 42 U.S.C. § 2255 was no more successful than his direct appeal.  See Conners v. 
United States, 989 F.2d 504 (unpublished table decision), 1993 WL 72388 (8th Cir. Mar. 17, 1993). 
 295. 916 F. Supp. 268, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 296. Id. at 270 n.3.  A similar argument went nowhere in Donahue v. Matrix Financial Servic-
es Corp., 86 F.3d 1161 (unpublished table decision), 1996 WL 266490 (9th Cir. May 17, 1996).  In 
that case, the plaintiff, Donahue, produced a letter from the judge’s law clerk to defendant Matrix’s 
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Equally ineffective was the plaintiff’s motion to recuse Judge Gene 
Brooks’s law clerk in Johnston v. Amax Coal Co.,297 which Judge 
McKinney described as follows: 
On July 6, 1994, Defendant Amax Coal Company, Inc. (“Amax” or 
“Company”) filed its motion for summary judgment, which Judge 
Brooks granted in an order dated August 11, 1995 (“August Or-
der”).  Subsequently, Plaintiff Charlotte Johnston filed a motion to 
reconsider coupled with a motion to recuse Judge Brooks’ law 
clerk.  Essentially, Judge Brooks had made the parties aware that 
one of his clerks, Kevin Patmore, had rendered substantial assis-
tance in the behind-the-scenes analysis of the summary judgment 
motion.  In an article appearing in the October 31, 1994 edition of 
the Evansville Press, this same clerk made certain comments re-
garding the admission of women to the Citadel.  Because Patmore’s 
comments reflected a negative view toward allowing women in a 
previously all-male institution—a situation somewhat analogous to 
Johnston’s claim against Amax—Johnston feared that Patmore’s 
personal views might have tainted the Court’s analysis of the sum-
mary judgment materials.  Accordingly, she requested that Judge 
Brooks personally reconsider Amax’s motion.  In an order dated 
August 30, 1996, Judge Brooks granted Johnston’s motion to recon-
sider but refused her request to recuse Patmore from this reconside-
ration.  Judge Brooks has since retired, and the matter has been 
reassigned to this Court.298 
Unfortunately, at least for the development of law-clerk jurisprudence, 
Judge Brooks’s retirement mooted the predicament posed by Patmore’s 
purported pedagogical patriarchal prejudice. 
D.  Accusations of Incompetence 
From the accusations in the previous section, that law clerks did 
things that law clerks are not supposed to do under any circumstances, I 
turn, in this section, to unsuccessful accusations by litigants that they 
were harmed in some way by law clerks engaged in permissible law-
clerk activities, but who executed them poorly.  In the first instance, par-
ties have claimed that they are entitled to relief for procedural missteps 
because they were led into error by relying on the advice of law clerks.  
In the second instance, parties have claimed that they are entitled to relief 
because they said something or another to a law clerk which, in their 
                                                                                                             
the district court ruled in favor of [Matrix].”  Id. at *3.  Unfortunately for Donahue, “Matrix’s coun-
sel did not follow the law clerk’s recommendation.”  Id.  But why let a mere fact get in the way of a 
juicy argument? 
 297. 963 F. Supp. 758 (S.D. Ind. 1997). 
 298. Id. at 761–62. 
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view, was sufficient to put the court on notice of whatever it is they told 
the law clerk.  Neither approach has much to recommend it. 
1. Law Clerks Say the Darndest Things, or, 
The Law Clerk Made Me Do It299 
The pages of the Federal Reporter are amply endowed, if not lit-
tered, with opinions soundly rejecting pleas for relief from litigants 
claiming that they made various procedural missteps because they were 
directed to do so by the law clerks on whom they relied for guidance. 
In Merrell-National Laboratories, Inc. v. Zenith Laboratories, 
Inc.,300 the defendants “argued that the time for filing a motion under 
[Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] should be tolled be-
cause of their alleged reliance on statements of the trial judge’s law 
clerk . . . .”301  The court of appeals disagreed, on grounds that “[t]he ten-
day limitation on the time for making such motions may not be waived 
by the trial judge.”302 
Judge Alvin Rubin, in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Alex-
ander,303 discussed in more substantive terms the perils of relying on 
law-clerk advice: 
The argument that the district court denied plaintiffs due 
process by giving assurances that laches was not an issue lacks any 
foundation in the record and is indeed belied by it.  Buttressed only 
by factual affidavits filed in this court for the first time, in disregard 
of our function as an appellate court, one of plaintiff’s counsel as-
serts that he spoke to one of the judge’s law clerks who told counsel 
that the judge did not plan to take evidence on any issue but the au-
thorization for the project at the hearing and that all other issues in-
cluding affirmative defenses would be heard later.  We repeat the 
argument in order to give it express condemnation: courts speak to 
litigants by orders or minute entries or judgments or, on occasion, at 
conference in chambers.  Ex parte communications with judges are 
generally disfavored.  Code of Judicial Conduct for United States 
Judges, Canon 3 A(4).  A fortiori, neither ex parte communication 
with a judge’s clerks nor reliance upon such communication can be 
condoned.304 
                                                 
 299. And, yes, I do recognize the spiritual tension between “One Step Over the Line, Sweet 
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 300. 579 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 301. Id. at 790. 
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228 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:173 
Judge Rubin’s plain statement that reliance on law-clerk communications 
is no defense to a procedural error has not dissuaded other attorneys from 
running such arguments up the flagpole, only to watch, disappointed, as 
judges fail to salute. 
In United Coin Meter Company v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad,305 
Judge Pierce Lively was moved to write: “As with the oral withdrawal of 
a written motion, the reliance on a conversation with the district judge’s 
law clerk rather than the record in the clerk’s office to determine the date 
of withdrawal is an unsatisfactory practice.”306  Similar arguments have 
failed in situations where an attorney “contend[ed] that he did not submit 
[certain medical] reports before the Magistrate issued his finding because 
the Magistrate’s law clerk lulled him into a ‘false sense of security’ by 
representing that the Magistrate had a backlog of Social Security cas-
es,”307 and where a “clerk responded favorably [to an attorney’s state-
ment that he intended to seek an extension of the time to file motions] 
and, representing that he was speaking for the court, advised counsel that 
‘any reasonable extension beyond the three weeks would [also] be 
granted.’”308 
And then there is this, from Judge Kathleen O’Malley, in a case in-
volving application of the statute of limitations to members of the plain-
tiff class in a class-action lawsuit: 
Plaintiff’s counsel argues that [a particular filing] date should go-
vern because he informed one of the Court’s prior law clerks that he 
was collecting consents for collective filing so as not to impose an 
administrative burden on the Court, and the Clerk effectively ap-
proved this procedure.  The Court gives no weight to this argument.  
First, no law clerk would have the authority to approve a practice 
not authorized by applicable law.  Second, law clerks in these 
chambers do not “authorize” any unusual procedures without first 
consulting the Court.  And third, counsel has no right to seek legal 
                                                 
 305. 705 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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advice from a law clerk; he has an obligation to research the law on 
his own.309 
Notwithstanding the low batting average achieved by counsel arguing for 
relief based upon allegedly faulty law-clerk advice, an attorney brought 
that argument to the plate as recently as 2007, in American Safety In-
demnity Co. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Ameri-
can Safety Indemnity Co.).310  Yet again, the argument struck out: 
The wisdom of Bowles is confirmed in this case by the mischief 
that would be spawned by excusing untimeliness on the basis of law 
clerk statements.  Litigants should not seek legal advice from judges 
or judicial staff, and in any case, attorneys should know better than 
to rely on such advice.  Moreover, ad hoc inquiries regarding pur-
ported advice are difficult to conduct, lead to uncertain results and 
meddle in the internal workings of judges’ chambers.311 
The rule is unmistakable: claiming to have been misled by bad advice 
from a law clerk is never a successful defense to a procedural mistake. 
I conclude this section with what must be the most amazing exam-
ple of misplaced reliance ever.  In United States v. Gonzalez,312 the de-
fendant sought post-conviction relief from Judge Whitman Knapp, which 
he denied.313  The case was then reassigned to Judge Michael Mukasey, 
before whom the defendant mounted an attack on Judge Knapp’s or-
der.314  Among other things, Gonzalez “assert[ed] that Judge Knapp was 
not competent at the time he heard and decided” the motion for post-
conviction relief.315  Judge Mukasey found that argument devoid of me-
rit.316  He noted that before Judge Knapp decided the issue, he suggested 
he might reassign the case, and that, in response, Gonzalez’s counsel vi-
gorously objected, on grounds that Judge Knapp was “the only person in 
a position to assess the credibility of the witnesses who appeared . . . and 
make the appropriate findings of fact”317 and was “uniquely positioned to 
make the factual findings necessary to apply the controlling legal prin-
ciples.”318  Gonzalez’s counsel then “most respectfully request[ed] that 
                                                 
 309. Whipkey v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., No. 1:02CV1030, 2006 WL 840371, at *2 n.3 
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[Judge Knapp] see this motion through to its conclusion”319 and closed 
his memorandum of law “with the ‘sincere[ ] hope that [Judge Knapp] 
will maintain this motion on [his] docket and that [he] will make the fac-
tual findings necessary to resolve it.’”320  While Judge Mukasey was per-
haps amused by Gonzalez’s dramatic one-eighty, he was not persuaded: 
In the reply memorandum in behalf of Gonzalez, Eisemann ad-
vances an explanation for this inconsistency that is, if anything, an 
even bigger jaw-dropper than the inconsistency itself.  That reply 
memorandum, backed now by an affidavit, asserts, as did the initial 
memorandum that “Judge Knapp’s law clerk deliberately tele-
graphed that Judge Knapp viewed defendant’s per se conflict claim 
favorably,” and, if this court thinks the obvious contradictions be-
tween the 2003 correspondence [asking Judge Knapp to decide the 
issue] and Gonzalez’s current position are material, seeks a hearing 
at which counsel would prove the “subjective motivation” for their 
letters to Judge Knapp, as follows: 
It was certainly not because they believed Judge Knapp 
was mentally competent at the time.  Instead, it was be-
cause they believed he had already decided to rule in de-
fendant’s favor at a time when he had still been competent 
and had made that clear to his law clerk and counsel ex-
pected chambers to follow that direction. 
In other words, Eisemann and Young seek a hearing where they 
would establish that both of them lied to a court once in order to 
protect an anticipated victory, but that they would not lie to a court 
again in order to reverse an actual defeat. 
Although there may exist somewhere on this globe a tribunal 
that could summon just the right blend of cynicism and naivete ne-
cessary to support that finding, our law provides a doctrine to make 
sure that this tribunal isn’t it.  That doctrine is called judicial estop-
pel . . . .321 
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 321. Id. at 735–36 (citation to the record omitted).  Judge Mukasey further seasoned his al-
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2. If I Told You Once . . ., or, 
The Law Clerk Should Have Done It 
The key lesson of the previous section is that the mouth of a law 
clerk is not the mouth of the court.  In this section, I focus on cases in 
which litigants have learned, to their detriment, that the ears of a law 
clerk are not the ears of the court. 
In Glenn v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,322 the appellant argued, on appeal 
from a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, “that the trial court erred in 
limiting the time for opening statement and closing argument.”323  The 
court of appeals began its analysis by considering “whether plaintiffs 
sufficiently preserved the issue for appeal,”324 and held that they did not: 
Although no objection to the court’s limitations on opening 
statement and closing argument appear in the record, plaintiffs as-
sert that they raised a sufficient objection with the trial judge’s law 
clerk.  Plaintiffs allege that an objection to the limitations was pur-
sued with the law clerk pursuant to the court’s instructions and that 
the clerk reported that the judge denied plaintiffs’ request for addi-
tional time.  Reliance upon a law clerk to resolve such matters, gen-
erally, is improper.325 
Similarly, as the Fifth Circuit once explained, objections to jury instruc-
tions are not preserved when made only to a law clerk: 
A “formal objection is not necessary if the trial judge was fairly 
apprised of the nature of the objection.”  Appellants objected to the 
instructions “to the extent any charge [they] requested was not giv-
en by the Court.”  This is little more than a nod to Rule 51; it is not 
sufficient to inform the trial court of a perceived problem.  Appel-
lants also suggest that they objected to the materiality instructions in 
a conference with the district court’s law clerk.  Such communica-
tion with a law clerk may assist the court in its preparation of the 
charge.  It is not a legally sufficient objection.  Moreover, this “con-
ference” with the law clerk was not included in the record on ap-
peal.  In sum, we find no adequate objection and without an objec-
tion, we will listen only to plain error.326 
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The issue in United States v. Combs327 concerned the court’s responses to 
a pair of questions posed by the jury during its deliberations.328  After the 
jury sent out its questions: 
The court, through its law clerk, notified counsel for all parties that 
it was inclined to answer “yes” to the first question, and “no” to the 
second.  The law clerk directed counsel to submit any comments or 
objections to the proposed responses to him, rather than to the court.  
The record does not reflect any such objections, although the defen-
dants unsuccessfully attempted to supplement the record after trial 
with an objection purportedly given to the law clerk by [defense] 
counsel.329 
The trial court gave the responses the law clerk had discussed with coun-
sel, and the jury convicted the defendants on one of the four counts 
against them.330  On appeal, they argued that the court erred in its re-
sponse to the jury questions, but the court of appeals held that the objec-
tion had not been properly preserved: 
During oral argument, Snow’s counsel contended that she had 
attempted to object to the proposed supplemental instructions by 
communicating her comments to the district judge through his law 
clerk.  Both counsel admitted, however, that they never asked to 
have the district judge take the bench, nor did they otherwise try to 
create a record of their objections, if any.  Despite claimed ob-
stacles, it always is the duty—and right—of trial counsel to make a 
verbatim record on any matter germane to the trial, particularly mat-
ters as vital as objections to jury instructions and supplemental in-
structions. 
Here, the record does not reflect any attempt to create a con-
temporaneous record articulating objections to the proposed sup-
plemental instructions.  Allegations by Snow’s counsel, long after 
the fact, that she lodged an objection with the district judge’s law 
clerk cannot suffice to preserve her objection.331 
If you want the judge to hear something, tell it to the judge.  Accept no 
substitutes.  And if you want something filed, send it to the folks who file 
things: 
As to Plaintiff’s first request, Plaintiff states that he mailed cop-
ies of his brief to chambers on April 25, 2005, with a note asking 
                                                 
 327. 33 F.3d 667 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 328. Id. at 668. 
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the Judge’s law clerk to file a copy with the Clerk’s office.  The 
brief was not filed until June 20, 2005 and Plaintiff asks that the 
date on which it was filed be changed to April 25, 2005, the date it 
was mailed.  Under L. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(3) the moving party is respon-
sible for delivering a reply brief to the Clerk’s office.  The judge’s 
law clerk is not responsible for filing papers that are mailed directly 
to chambers.  Therefore, Plaintiff’s first request is denied.332 
Law clerks do a lot, but we don’t do filing.333 
IV. CONCLUSION 
So there you have it, the remarkably short (dis)Honor Roll of law 
clerks who have gone astray on their own, the somewhat longer list of 
law clerks who took missteps at the behest of their judges, and a sizeable 
collection of cases in which litigants or their attorneys have tried, unsuc-
cessfully, to gin up issues based on law-clerk conduct.  Practically speak-
ing, this Article provides a very small helping of very obvious advice for 
once and future trial-court law clerks (i.e., don’t convene court as in Ri-
ley, and don’t conduct freelance investigations as in Kennedy), and exact-
ly half as much advice for current and prospective appellate law clerks 
(i.e., don’t leak draft opinions to the press as in Lamprecht).  But that’s a 
rather paltry payoff for all the effort you’ve invested in reading this far.  
Perhaps, however, the fact that this Article appears to have little value as 
an appendix to the Law Clerk Code of Conduct makes a more important 
point.  Commentators have had plenty to say about the deleterious effects 
of the rise of the clerkigentsia.334  But, based on my research, the really 
scary law clerks are entirely fictional.  Law-clerk conduct that threatens 
the basic integrity of the American legal system is all but absent from the 
pages of the Federal Reporter and the Federal Supplement, and can be 
found only on the fiction shelf, in books such as The Simple Truth,335 
9 Scorpions,336 and The Tenth Justice.337  That might be a small comfort, 
but it’s nothing to sneeze at in a day and age when integrity can some-
times seem in short supply in both the public and private sectors. 
 
                                                 
 332. Walzer v. Muriel Siebert & Co., No. 04-5672 (DRD), 2006 WL 454368, at *1 (D.N.J. 
Feb. 23, 2006). 
333. And, at least in the courthouses where I’ve worked, we don’t do windows, either. 
 334. See, e.g., Wichern, supra note 191. 
 335. DAVID BALDACCI, THE SIMPLE TRUTH (1998) (Supreme Court law clerk intercepts peti-
tion for certiorari in the mail room, before it can be filed with the court). 
 336. PAUL LEVINE, 9 SCORPIONS (1998) (Supreme Court law clerk seduces her judge in order 
to influence the outcome of a case before the Court for her former lover). 
 337. BRAD MELTZER, THE TENTH JUSTICE (1997) (Supreme Court law clerk leaks the result in 
a pending case prior to publication of the Court’s opinion). 
